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Another Abraham:
Jewishness and the Law of the Father
Jonathan Boyarin*
Freud seems to project into prehistoric times the constitutional
crisis of seventeenth-century England. The primal father is
absolute monarch of the horde; the females are his property. The
sons form a conspiracy to overthrow the despot, and in the end
substitute a social contract with equal rights for all. This
anachronistic history directs us to look for the recurrence of the
archetype in the seventeenth century.'
Jewish interpretation is inscribed in the form of the mirror of the
Occident in search of the principle of Reason. At the present
time, this is not yet understood, owing to the indirect effect of
the anti-Semitic scheme. It is patently clear that Jewish
interpretation continues to be excluded from reflection on West
European jurisprudence, all the while that the entire scholastic
system acquires shape and consistency from its very reliance on
the ancestral quarrel. Mark this reference to ancestors, so crucial
to comprehending the great debate over religious filiation at the
interior of a Christianity seeking to found itself upon Judaism,
whose interpretation is considered carnal.2
I could conceive of another Abraham for myself-he certainly
would have never gotten to be a patriarch or even an old-clothes
dealer-who was prepared to satisfy the demand for a sacrifice
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School; Ph.D., New School for Social Research. I am grateful
to kind and critical readers of earlier drafts of this Article, including Daniel Boyarin, Robert
Burt, David Gray Carlson, Jay Geller, Thomas Luxon, Mira Morgenstern, Eric Santner, Simon
Schneebalg, Jeanne Schroeder, Susan Shapiro, and Mark Weiner, and to those with whom I had
equally productive conversations at various points, including Sander Gilman, Geoffrey Hartman,
Jay Katz, Austin Sarat, James Whitman, and Steven Wilf.
1. NORMAN 0. BROwN, LOVE'S BODY 3 (1966).
2. PIERRE LEGENDRE, LE DtSIR POLITIQUE DE DIEU: tTUDE SUR LES MONTAGES DE
L't AT ET DU DROIT 297 (1992) (translation mine).
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immediately, with the promptness of a waiter, but was unable to
bring it off because he could not get away, being indispensable;
the household needed him, there was perpetually something or
other to put in order, the house was never ready; for without
having his house ready, without having something to fall back on,
he could not leave-this the Bible also realized, for it says: "He
set his house in order."3
INTRODUCMION
"It is an extremely painful thing," writes Kafka, "to be ruled by
laws that one does not know."4 Equally terrible, as so many of his
tales remind us, is to submit onself to laws that contradict one
another. The modern European liberal ideal of autonomy-the
command from outside to be rulers of ourselves-is perhaps the most
imperious and terrible such command we know. Nevertheless that
ideal has taken hold to such an extent that it often seems a veritable
given of natural law. Still, even an entrenched ideal of autonomy
cannot dispense with the inevitability of received authority-that is,
of a law beyond self-regulation. Within a theory of identity and rights
governed by the ideal of autonomy, received authority is inherently
problematic; law, so to speak, is illegitimate.
The allusion to questionable filiation in our vernacular use of the
word "illegitimate" is indeed germane here. For in psychoanalysis, the
oxymoronic notion of illegitimate law, a central modern theory of
identity, is traced through a notion of patriarchy, "the Law of the
Father." What is seen as illegitimate in patriarchy is its forceful
imposition upon weaker children (the theory in fact speaks only of
sons), while the authoritative power of law is seen as grounded in
guilt at the sons' rebellion against the Father. In perhaps the most
common version of Western liberalism's foundation story, the
institution of patriarchy is tied to the religion of the Old Testament.
This Article examines the common notion of a shared source and
a privileged historical relationship linking Jewish monotheism, patriar-
chy as a social institution, and the legal systems of modern Western
states. I claim that modern critical identifications of ancient Israelite
religion as the source of patriarchal repression actually reflect the
ideological dilemma of an impossible ideal of individual autonomy.
Furthermore, there are fundamental differences between understan-
3. Franz Kafka, Abraham, in PARABLES 37, 37 (Clement Greenberg et al. trans., 1947); see
also Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka, in ILLUMINATIONS 125 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn
trans., 1969) (discussing this parable); Jill Robbins, Kafka's Parables, in MIDRASH AND
LITERATURE 275 (Geoffrey H. Hartman & Sanford Budick eds., 1985) (same).
4. Franz Kafka, The Problem of Our Laws, in PARABLES, supra note 3, at 119, 119.
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dings of the nexus among ancestry, text, and subject in Jewishness and
in Protestant modernity. While the psychoanalytic notion of "the law
of the Father" points toward the centrality of this nexus, it offers a
progressivist and supersessionist account that effectively privileges
Christianity.
This Article will therefore press the claim that "the Law of the
Father" is particular to Protestant notions of interpretation, selfhood,
and authority. We need not deny the patriarchal form of Israelite clan
structures in order to insist that the problem of the Law of the Father
does not stem in any linear heritage from "The Decalogue," from
"the Old Testament," from "Moses," or from "Abraham." Rather, the
question of legitimacy and paternity is the expression in modernity of
a constitutive aporia at the heart of Pauline Christianity between, on
one hand, the foundationalism of the church, and on the other, the
demand for individual autonomy (not just as a "right," but as an
imperative). Furthermore, the rebellion against a presumptively
outmoded, "old man" patriarchy is formulated in the Reformation,
carried forward into the Enlightenment, and has informed twen-
tieth-century critical hermeneutics of language, gender, and identity.
This Article thus explores how psychoanalysis produces a narrative
of mediation between Jewishness and European modernity.
Psychoanalysis is understood here both as an important resource for
understanding Jewishness and the law of the liberal subject as two
contrasting structures of identification and differentiation, and as a
cultural form to be analyzed in its own right-a form that emerges to
a substantial extent precisely out of the confrontation between
Jewishness and liberalism in a period of crisis for both (the decades
leading up to World War II). More specifically, I aim to illuminate a
teleology elaborated in the Reformation and Enlightenment that
fundamentally orients Freud's account of religion and law, and the
danger for criticism if it fails to see that teleology at work.
Because of their failure to take this progressive and liberationist
teleology into account, many critical analyses of psychoanalysis and
authority share in Freud's view of ancestral authority as a problem to
be overcome through the achievement of autonomy, rather than as a
facultative condition of human existence. The view of ancestral
authority as a burden is reflected in accounts that claim that
genealogies work to naturalize history or impose a retrospective
teleology by identification with some founding authorization.5
Alternatively, "genealogy" has been proposed as a method of research
5. For an example of the understanding of genealogy this Article works against, see
TIMOTHY BAHTI, ALLEGORIES OF HISTORY 156 (1992) ("A beginning, especially an organic
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that uncovers the occluded wellsprings of continuing oppression.6 This
Article relies on a third understanding of genealogy, in which kin-
ship-the relations of generation of the human organism-are both
central to and inseparable from language and culture.7 Thus the idea
of genealogy here is introduced in order to resist the positing of an
ontological split between biology and language, and hence the
repeated impulse to assume some mythical moment of violation when
language was superimposed upon a thenceforward helpless biological
nature.
Here it must suffice to suggest that, although the Protestant context
of the seventeenth-century debate over patriarchalism reinforces the
rhetorical tendency to see patriarchy as stemming from the so-called
Old Testament,8  patriarchy is not in fact a distinctively
"Judaeo-Christian" phenomenon.9 On the contrary, "[f]rom Jean
Bodin to Lewis Morgan to contemporary scholars, Rome has provided
the paradigm of patriarchy in western thought."'" Hence, inasmuch
as Freud looked to ancient Rome as the very model of Western
civilization,t" the account of the origin of the supposed Law of the
Father may also have been motivated by an assumption that such
paternal potestas characteristic of Rome was a necessary attribute of
civilization. Indeed, the standard Occidentalist account has it both
ways: Ancient Rome is both the very model of civilization and the
benchmark of progressive Western social evolution away from Roman
6. Thus Nietzsche is described as proposing a genealogical method that "seeks to reestablish
[i.e., render visible] the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning,
but the hazardous play of dominations." Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in
LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 139, 140 (Donald F. Bouchard ed. & Donald F.
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977).
7. See Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyarin, Generation: Diaspora and the Ground of Jewish
Identity, 19 CRrICAL INOUIRY 693 (1993).
8. Peter Goodrich suggests direct derivation from the legendary "destruction of an idol" that
founds decalogic law to "the inaugural doctrinal discourses or treatises of common law [that]
inherit or replicate the structures of classical Western patristic writings...." PETER GOODRICH,
OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW, at ix (1995). He later reiterates the theme:
"It was no accident that in its earliest representation in the decalogue, the icon of law as
commandment inscribed in stone was instituted, or founded, upon the destruction of an idol."
Id. at 223. Goodrich claims that the destruction of this idol-the golden calf--effects an
"exclusion of difference in its various imaginary forms," including "the Egyptian, the foreigner
or stranger," "the plurality of sources and of meanings," and "the feminine." Id. But Jewishness
cannot unequivocally be said to inaugurate any of these rejections. At least in certain of its
dominant manifestations, it enjoins welcome of the Egyptian, see Deuteronomy 23:8, Exodus
12:20, and it welcomes a multiplicity of voices and interpretations within an overarching
hermeneutic framework, see, e.g., DANIEL BOYARIN, INTERTEXTUALITY AND THE READING OF
MIDRASH (1990), and resists Hellenic misogyny, see DANIEL BOYARIN, CARNAL ISRAEL:
READING SEX IN TALMUDIC CULTURE (1993) [hereinafter BOYARIN, CARNAL ISRAEL].
9. "Patriarchs," meaning "father-rulers," is a misleading translation of avot, the Jewish term
that is used to designate Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and that means simply "fathers."
10. RICHARD P. SALLER, PATRIARCHY, PROPERTY AND DEATH IN THE ROMAN FAMILY
224 (1994).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss2/3
1997] Boyarin
paternal tyranny to "loving care for children in the contemporary
family.' t2 On the other hand, the same authority insists that the
Roman pattern of "[w]aiting until death to transmit the patrimony
required testators to place considerable reliance on the legal system
and trust in survivors to carry out their wishes." 3 The written will
thus survived as the Law of the Father. This provides us with an
entirely plausible starting point for a very different account of the
relations among paternity, property, and textual Law than the one
offered by Freud in Totem and Taboo, which I discuss at length
below. For now, however, the evident prominence of patriarchy in
ancient Rome must remain the starting point for a different argument
from that made here.
1 4
My discussion of paternity and autonomy in psychoanalysis is
grounded in a brief discussion of the English Renaissance with its
revolutionary stress on the autonomy of the adult vis-A-vis the law.
That notion of radical autonomy was recognized as insufficient for the
establishment of society. Yet what was bargained away in return for
security was understood as a loss and, as Blackstone stressed much
later, it was assumed that the least given away the better: "Political
therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no
other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no
further) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
12. SALLER, supra note 10, at 232. Sailer points out that this caricature of the overweening
Roman father "from beyond the grave" misses both balancing factors in Roman culture and the
demographic contingencies that made early orphanage virtually the norm, thus favoring the
elaboration of testamentary devices I mention briefly here. More to the point of this Article, the
simple evolutionary model criticized by Sailer regarding ancient Rome is analogous to Freud's
progressivist account of the transition from primitive taboos to civilized self-reflection and
self-regulation. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
13. SALLER, supra note 10, at 232.
14. The French scholar Pierre Legendre insists on the centrality of the occluded Roman
heritage in contemporary Western law. Since Legendre's legal anthropology will be central to
claims made toward the end of this Article, his own statement of how he arrived at this
conviction bears extended quotation:
I conclude that there exists, from the point of view of jurists nourished by the Western
tradition, a prohibited substratum .... [This prohibition] aims to dissuade interpretive
effort, regarded as illicit, that is to say subversive . .. . My frequentation of medieval
glossaries, a stint as a technocrat in the African desert, then an apprenticeship in the great
work of psychoanalysis, were to contribute to the clarification of the terms of a debate
which was controlled, evaded with hints, [then] experientially reconstituted at Nanterre
where the old paradigm of the Law and of its Terror were singularly placed before me:
then the text of the [Church] Fathers was reproduced by new clerics installed in the eternal
University and speaking comically of liberty, without awareness of what they imitated;
admirable scenes where the most antique repertoire was closely sifted, by law students and
their professors who instinctively recaptured the liturgies. In the canonical debate, several
versions of the Law are recited and the roles of Romans are played.
PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'AMoUR DU CENSEURE: ESSAI SUR L'ORDRE DOGMATIQUE 8-9 (1974)
(translation mine); see also Anton Schtiltz, Sons of Writ, Sons of Wrath: Pierre Legendre's
Critique of Rational Law-Giving, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 979, 980-85 (1995).
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public.""I It is easy to see why this can be criticized as a mys-
tification, especially since Blackstone himself noted that this "original
contract of society ... [had] ... perhaps in no instance [] ever been
formally expressed at the first institution of a state .. "16 Black-
stone thus explicitly recognizes the notion of the social contract as a
foundational fiction.
By contrast, the psychoanalytic foundational fiction of the origin of
the law and civilization is tormented by the dilemma of positing
simultaneously that its origin myth "really happened" and that its
"memory" is instituted as an unconscious explanation of unnatural
restraints on individual will. Much of what follows is concerned with
examining how the relationship between textual authority and
subjecthood in Jewishness on the one hand, and the historical
circumstances under which members of Jewish communities were
transformed into bourgeois "individuals" in the course of one or two
generations on the other, can be correlated with both the divergences
and congruencies of the liberal-legal and the psychoanalytic accounts
of the tension between the individual and society. Moreover, these
correlations are not merely matters of analogy. The figure of "the
Jew," the Jewish Bible, and Jewish law are all fundamental terms in
the Reformation and Enlightenment debates that found liberalism.
Notions of personal autonomy elaborated in those founding debates
set the terms by which the emancipation and integration of Jews into
liberal Western society was to be accomplished. Freud's
psychoanalysis in large part constitutes a disguised commentary on the
reform of Jewish personhood 7 as part of that emancipation.
Following my discussion of the English Reformation and its
Enlightenment aftermath, I turn to that aspect of Freud's work in
which he explains the origins of civilized law through the story of the
primal horde and the murder of the tyrannical father. The problem
that Freud sought to solve in his just-so story of civilization,
understood through Jacques Lacan's reformulation as the problem of
the imposition of language on human animals, is the starting point for
the culminating section, which sketches an anthropology of law and
language as foundational to the human species. There I will identify
the logical relation between Lacan's Pauline metaphysics and his claim
for a paternal, linguistic "repression" of the natural mother-child
relation. Moreover, I will contrast to Lacan's account the relation
between the claim made by another French scholar, the legal historian
15. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121.
16. Id. at *47.
17. See DANIEL BOYARIN, UNHEROIC CONDUCr THE RISE OF HETEROSEXUALITY AND
THE INVENTION OF THE JEWISH MALE (1997).
350
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Pierre Legendre, for the importance of Jewish understandings of text
and subject and Legendre's deontologized reference to "separation"
between mother and child (rather than "repressive") on the other.18
The purpose there is to point out how some of the continuing blind
spots of psychoanalytic, critical legal, and feminist theory arise from
displaced rhetorics of patriarchy and the Law as "Jewish," rhetorics
that were both challenged and reinforced in the modern, critical
Jewish overlay onto older Christian discourses to the tension between
patriarchy and autonomy.
In the last section I develop an argument for the explicit rein-
tegration of genealogy into the discourse about autonomy and
legitimacy in the West. Such a reintegration is needed to prevent the
continuing discussion of the relations among gender, embodiment, and
the law19 from collapsing back into the discursive blind alley of law's
illegitimacy. At the same time, stressing that our law, too, is in-
separable from the anthropology of kinship and group identity may
further the vexed project of integrating a Western law that seeks
universal validity with the broadest range of symbolic authorities to
which people respond throughout the world now. This argument
about genealogy, anthropology, and law is contained in the final
section's heading, "Anthropology-In-Law." A brief Conclusion then
restates in summary form my claim regarding the relevance of
Jewishness to this expanded view of law in society.
One reference point must be stressed at the outset: Each of these
aspects of the Western tension between autonomy and genealogy
confronts anew the Pauline "paradoxes of universality."' Paul
associates the Law with Jewish chauvinism and with carnality-that
is, both literalist, "fleshly" reading and the bodily passions aroused by
law that inspire us to generate children who are only destined to
death.1 Paul's effort to free Christians from the notion that they
should follow the practical dictates of the Torah, of Israel "in the
18. See supra epigraph accompanying note 2. Legendre's acknowledgment of Jewishness is
linked to his recognition of the suppression of Roman models. See supra note 14.
19. See THINKING THROUGH THE BODY OF THE LAW (Pheng Cheah et al. eds., 1996) (con-
sidering effects of critical awareness of embodiment on understandings of legal doctrine).
20. Etienne Balibar, Paradoxes of Universality, in THE ANATOMY OF RACISM 283 (David
Theo Goldberg ed., 1990). Robert Cover links these paradoxes to "Paul's diatribe against the
Law." See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 104 n.31 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
ESSAYS OF COVER]. As Robert Paul has recently phrased it, "What for the Jews has been the
support for an ongoing social system has been reinterpreted through the lens of the Christian
myth as an intolerable condition, one from which a person self-evidently needs to be rescued."
ROBERT PAUL, MOSES AND CIvILIZATION 194 (1996).
21. See DANIEL BOYARIN, A RADICAL JEW: PAUL AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 13
(1994) (citing Romans 7:5: "For when we were still in the flesh, our sinful passions, stirred up
by the law, were at work on our members to bear fruit for death."). For Lacan's invocation of
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flesh," led to an emphasis on each individual's spiritual bonding with
Christ, followed by the voluntary union of those individuals with each
other in the "spiritual body of Christ., 22 Against the retrospective
reassurance of a genealogical inheritance, Paul insisted on faith in the
divine Promise, a "future interest" available to every believer.23
Rather than the "coming of Christ, his crucifixion, and resurrection"
constituting events within a saving history, they are "the end-telos,
both the finish and the revelation of the meaning-of history,, 24 and
the legend of history is now to be read only allegorically, always
referring beyond itself, "from the moment of ethnicity to the moment
of the universal (spiritual) subject, from natural birth to spiritual
rebirth in the Promise."'  Paul thus rhetorically undermines the Law
as a set of embodied practices, opposes both ascendant and descen-
dant genealogies, and thereby reaches a revolutionary articulation of
a spiritualized universalism:
Ye have put off the old man with his deeds, And have put on the
new man, that is renewed in knowledge after the image of him
that created him; Where there is neither Greek nor Jew,
circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor
free, but Christ is all, and in all.
26
Within these phrases may already be seen, if not the seeds, then
certainly the analogous impulses to those of radical Reformation
within Christianity (a kind of "renewal in knowledge"), and of the
Protestant conception of spirituality as "the struggle to be made
Christ."27 All of these moves entail a stress on the individual as free
22. BOYARIN, supra note 21, at 24. This sequence-individual transformation followed by
social union-is analogous to John Locke's conception of a pre-social "moral" community:
"Lockean nature not only allows for a community of interest but also constitutes a moral
community defined by the divine precepts embodied in natural law.... It is entirely possible
for the members of this moral community in the state of nature to be complete strangers to one
another!" Stephen L. Newman, Locke's Two Treatises and Contemporary Thought: Freedom,
Community, and the Liberal Tradition, in JOHN LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT:
NEW INTERPRETATIONS 173, 208 n.4 (Edward G. Harpham ed., 1992).
23. BOYARIN, supra note 21, at 31, 33.
24. Id. at 34-35.
25. Id.
26. Colossians 3:9-10. I quote this source, despite the existence of some doubt concerning
the attribution of Colossians directly to Paul, because the reference to the "old man" and the
"new man" are so germane to the discussions of paternity and supersession that recur
throughout this Article. See also:
For you are all children of God through faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were
baptized into Christ have put on Christ [saying]: 'There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is
neither slave nor free nor freeman; there is no male and female. For you are all one in
Christ Jesus.' If, however, you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs
according to the promise.
Galations 3:26-29; see also BOYARIN, supra note 21, at 22-25 (discussing this passage).
27. THOMAS LUXON, LITERAL FIGURES: PURITAN ALLEGORY AND THE REFORMATION
CRISIS IN REPRESENTATION 67 (1993).
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subject. This stress underlies the repeated crises of law and autonomy
that underlie the identity of the West: "[T]his 'New Individual' of
Western, Pauline Christianity distinguishes itself by a clause
stipulating a universal condition; 'If I Want to,' between the
Institution and itself.'"
THE REFORMATION AND AFTER
Although the Reformation did come to extol the patriarchal
family, its initial success lay in persuading a generation to
abandon the faith of its fathers. Ezekiel 21:18 became a banner
for Protestant reformers: "Do not walk in the statutes of your
fathers, nor observe their ordinances, nor defile yourself with
their idols."'29
This section, focusing on Luther, Locke, and Kant as key figures in
the Reformation and Enlightenment, has two purposes. First, it
extends the introduction's exploration of connections between debates
about paternity and legitimacy on one hand, and debates about
textual authority and hermeneutics on the other. Second, it
demonstrates the tension inherent in the Protestant ideal of
self-governance in an ordered state.
The modem civilization that, according to Freud's Civilization and
Its Discontents, uneasily contains the neuroses of "normal" individuals,
problematically relies on an internalization of the law. That process
of internalization was perhaps first articulated by Martin Luther in the
civil universalization of the Christian idea of calling. This entailed a
difficult reconciliation between the internal working of spirit and the
recognition of civic responsibility.30 Luther inherited from Paul the
distinction between the literal, material, externalized Law and the
spiritual, internal Gospel,31 but he did not renounce order. Rather
Luther made "the law" the guardian of conscience; for Luther, what
28. Schfitz, supra note 14, at 1008. This spiritual voluntarism is carried over into early
Christian ideologies of textual interpretation as well. On the Gospel depiction of Christ as
self-authorizing and self-interpreting, see Susan Noakes, Gracious Words: Luke's Jesus and the
Reading of Sacred Poetry at the Beginning of the Christian Era, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
READING 38 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1993).
29. STEVEN OZMENT, WHEN FATHERS RULED: FAMILY LIFE IN REFORMATION EUROPE
174 (1983).
30. Luther found it if anything more difficult to reconcile his conviction that Death had been
overcome by Christ, with his overwhelming grief at the death of his thirteen-year-old daughter
Magdelene. Unable to thank God for removing the girl "from the flesh, the world, the Turk, and
the Devil," Luther wrote to a friend asking the friend to " 'please give thanks to God in our
stead.' " Id. at 168.
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"the law does, according to Paul, is to make sin known."32 He argued
that "the terrifying of the conscience must proceed from the preaching
of the Law, to the end we may know that we have offended against
the Laws of God."33 The notion of spiritual "calling," borrowed from
the Gospel, was reconciled with the reality of an externalized Law, or
state power. "Calling" was henceforth civilized, associated with a
public order distinct from the private realm that is proper to the
Gospel. Thus Luther was able to relate the values needed for
governance to the spiritual qualities common to every Christian, while
preserving both a special place for hereditary nobility and public
officials and a special, private realm of conscience.'
The rationalization of the civic realm was accompanied by what
Harold Berman describes as "professionalization" of appellate
procedure through institutionalized law school faculties in the
sixteenth century. That institutionalization contributed toward a
profound jurisprudential shift away from "finding" and then declaring
the law in a particular case to "applying" the law based on
schematized doctrines. Packaging and presenting the law in such
schematic fashion contributed to the need, felt already in sixteenth-
century Germany by the Lutheran jurist Oldendorp, of always
matching "law" with equity, "since all law is general and abstract.
3 6
A good Protestant, Oldendorp derived certain aspects of civil law
from various of the Ten Commandments, and the good jurist was
enjoined to study both the Bible and his conscience and pray to God
before rendering a decision.37 Equity, on the other hand, was to be
found inside every man who would search honestly for it; Oldendorp
relied on a doctrine of
a God-given, Biblical natural law; through his God-given con-
science each person has the capacity to discern it and to observe
it. Conscience is, for Oldendorp, indeed a form of reason; it is
32. See Stephen Westerholm, Law, Grace and the 'Soteriology' of Judaism, in LAW IN
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE ROMAN PERIOD: THE DEBATE OVER TORAH AND NOMOS
IN POST-BIBLICAL JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY 57,59 (P. Richardson & S. Westerholm
eds., 1991) (citing Luther's The Bondage of the Will).
33. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 125 (1972) (quoting Luther).
On the Protestant poetics of self-governance, see VASSILIS LAMBROPOULOS, THE RISE OF
EUROCENTRISM: ANATOMY OF INTERPRETATION (1992).
34. See Harold J. Berman, Conscience and Law: The Lutheran Reformation and the Western
Legal Tradition, 5 J. L. & RELIGION 177, 190 (1987) "[Luther's] Protestantism placed th[e]
responsibility [to reform the secular society] on every Christian, and especially on the prince and
the Obrigkeit [civil service corps]. Each was a 'private person' in his relation to God, but each
had a public responsibility to his calling." Id. at 194 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 185-86.
36. Id. at 196.
37. Id. at 195, 198. The implications for contemporary critical theory of this Protestant ideal
of self-regulation through an individualized, hermeneutic conscience are sharply and
controversially examined in LAMBROPOULOS, supra note 33.
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not, however, ordinary human reason, or civil reason (ratio
civilis), but a divine reason implanted in man, which Oldendorp
calls natural reason (ratio naturalis) .... The natural power
implanted by God in man's conscience "does not depend on the
power of the person.... God has written it into your mind .. .
"Conscience," he wrote, "is an infallible guide."
The Reformation also posed analogous challenges to the traditional
links between political order and theology in England. Church and
state were hardly separate in early modern Europe. On the contrary,
".... in England from the Reformation to the Enlightenment ...
[c]hurch and state formed a single continuum, and political and
theological questions were seen as interdependent. Questions about
power and legitimacy rested in high degree upon exegetical and
interpretative ideas."'3 9
Many of these questions relied in turn on a tradition, dating back
to the Anglo-Saxon period, which thought of the nature and destiny
of the English as analogous to those of the ancient Israelites.'
Questions about authority, genealogy, and progress in the English
Reformation thus echoed powerfully in a twofold allegorization of the
relations between the contemporary Christian and the figure of the
Jew. Reformed Christianity overtly insisted on a literal rather than
allegorical reading of the Scripture, an ideology intended to make the
message of the Gospel directly accessible to each Christian reader
without the need for intercession by those schooled in hermeneutics.
Its movement of recuperation and return to the text relied heavily on
the tradition of identification with the ancient Israelites. Yet that
same movement of reform could not escape the tendency toward an
allegorical reading of the relations among the saving history of ancient
Israel, the situation of the Christian in the present and the divine
promise of spiritual redemption to come.41 Where medieval Christian
interpretation had seen the ancient Israelites of the "Old Testament"
as the immature, now-discarded husk from which realized Christianity
had sprung, now it was the "Reformation Christian [who was] seen,
not as fulfillment, but as figure of the fulfillment promised-and so
deferred-in the world to come."42 The reflexive self-making of the
Protestant Christian was to replicate, and hence complete, the process
38. Berman, supra note 34, at 194 (citations omitted).
39. James Barr, Foreword to HENNING GRAF REVENTLOW, THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE
AND THE RISE OF THE MODERN WORLD, at xii-xiii (1985).
40. See generally NICHOLAS HOWE, MIGRATION AND MYTHMAKING IN ANGLO-SAXON
ENGLAND (1989) (discussing Anglo-Saxon period); REVENTLOW, supra note 39, at 108-11
(discussing Reformation).
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of prefiguration and realization that summarized the relation between
the "Old Testament" Law and the Gospel. The Protestant self was
located at the midpoint of an allegorical stutter-step of saving Grace,
transcendant by analogy to the Jew (or "Papist") caught in the forms
of Law, but still "raw" Jew with regard to the future Redemption.
This double figuration of the Christian in terms of saving history
was accompanied by a debate over the validity of paternal authority,
both within the family and as the source of legitimate state rule. After
the break with Rome, authority was concentrated in the Crown by the
promotion of the claim that contemporary law originated in England
rather than in Rome, and that royal authority was "the constitutional
equivalent in natural and civil law of the absolute power of the
father., 43 Thus Filmer's Patriarcha, the most famous defense of the
thesis linking all law to the King and royal power to paternal power,
posits a forgotten royal fiat underlying every customary authority:
[W]hen every Custom began, there was something else than
Custom that made it lawful, or else the beginning of all Customs
were unlawful. Customs at first became Lawful only by some
Superiour, which did either Command or Consent unto their
beginning. And the first Power which we find (as it is confessed
by all men) is the Kingly Power, which was both in this and in all
other Nations of the World long before any Laws, or any other
kind of Government was thought of, from whence we must
necessarily infer[] that the Common Law itself, or Common
Customs of this Land, were Originally the Laws and Commands
of Kings at first unwritten.
44
In turn, the derisive attack on Filmer's Patriarcha in John Locke's
Two Treatises of Government was part of Locke's signal contribution
to the general suspicion of received authority in Reformation.45
After Locke's attack, patriarchalism was so discredited that even
enthusiasts of Filmer deprecate the patriarchalist theory of royal
legitimacy.46 Locke did not deny that the family was the probable
origin of government, nor the likelihood that the first ruler was a
43. GOODRICH, supra note 8, at 83.
44. SIR ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS 102 (Peter Laslett
ed., Blackwell 1949) (1680).
45. See JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: LOCKE IN CONTEXTS
191 (1993).
46. See GORDON SCHOCHET, PATRIARCHALISM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE
AUTHORITARIAN FAMILY AND POLITICAL SPECULATION AND ATTITUDES ESPECIALLY IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 2-3 (1975). To this day, "paternalism" carries a pejorative
overtone in legal scholarship with regard to such issues as legal protections of contracting par-
ties; attackers of a policy are likely to deem it "paternalistic," while defenders will speak of
"public policy."
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patriarchal monarch. 7 He did, however, regard that origin as
politically neutral and replaced its legitimizing function with a theory
of consent based on personal voluntarism.48 The decisive discrediting
of patriarchalism did not leave a void, but was replaced by yet
another precise articulation of subjectivity, of "a subject who is cal-
culating and calculable ... and the sovereign bearer of rights and
duties, subject to and of law from the voluntaristic perspective. 4 9
This voluntarism is not the same as an atheist or secularist perspec-
tive, nor does it disregard the prospect of ultimate divine reward and
punishment. On the contrary, Locke's claim is that the rational self,
looking to the expectations of the juridical order to determine what
actions and self-restraints will maximize its own pleasure and pain, is
precisely "the kind of self god [sic] created."5
Thus the divine will can be known through what satisfies the
individual's well-being, and there is no particular need for paternal
governance. Freedom from the need to underpin government by
analogy to patriarchal authority facilitated in turn the notion of
"progressive revelation." Belief in progress and the repudiation of
patriarchalism combined to offer the message that "the standards by
which the future was to be judged would be generated by the future
itself and not derived from some historically remote beginning.""
They meant that priesthood and ceremony could be dispensed with
along with all forms of "idolatry."52 Locke's belief in progress was
linked in turn to a voluntarism that was not merely philosophical, but
theosophical, referring to creation of the universe through the
workings of God's "omnipotence and his free will, not his reason."
53
It was because the universe reflected God's voluntary designs rather
than an underlying rationale in any way recuperable by humans that
the pleasure and pain experienced by individuals as a result of their
actions was the proper measure for self-regulation.
What is most essential in this prominent moment in the English
debate about paternity and authority is, however, the generally
overlooked distinction between contract and consent. Filmer, in fact,
was not merely an apologist for the English royal line; at least in part,
his theory that all authority originally stemmed from fathers (rather
than being proper to individuals) was aimed at inadequacies in the
47. See id. at 259.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 179.
50. TULLY, supra note 45, at 240.
51. SCHOCHET, supra note 46, at 275.
52. Eldon Eisenach, Religion and Locke's Two Treatises, in JOHN LOCKE'S TWO TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT NEW INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 22, at 50.
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theory of an original contract as the source of government. Filmer
denied that an ancestral contract, even if freely drawn, could of itself
suffice to bind descendants; "he was ultimately claiming that no one
could legitimately give away or limit what belonged to someone else
by nature.54 Locke's theory of consent recognized the same problem
in the theory of original contract, but consent as the alternative to
patriarchalism "represented the personal and contemporary manner
in which individuals could claim the same freedom that had belonged
to their fathers before them."55
The foundational tensions constructing understandings of law as the
articulation of polity and identity in the Christian West-tensions
between obligation and freedom, between law and Gospel, between
law and equity-were thus mirrored and renewed in the idea of
incompatibility between inherited contract and individual consent.
These two forms of authority would no longer be readily reconciled
in Western liberalism.
The tensions between contract and consent, explored by Locke,
were most powerfully addressed during the Enlightenment in the
writings of Kant. 6 One recent commentator has even claimed that
"no person gave stronger support to Locke's 'great bond of society'
than Kant."57 Locke's discussion of rights and Kant's elaboration of
individualized and universal morality helped rationalize "[t]he fully
developed public sphere [that] was based on the fictitious identity of the
two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to
form a public: the role of property owners and the role of human
beings pure and simple."58 That public sphere "arose first in Great
Britain," which was "the model case" for the Continent. 9 Generally,
Kant shared the English Radicals' confidence in both the evolution of
truth and the revelation of that truth in one's personal experience.' °
54. SCHOCHET, supra note 46, at 262.
55. Id.
56. The close thematic links between Locke and Kant are explored in Kenneth Minogue,
Locke, Kant and the Foundations of Liberalism, in JOHN LOCKE UND/AND IMMANUEL KANT
269 (Martyn P. Thompson ed., 1991).
57. EDWARD ANDREW, SHYLOCK'S RIGHTS: A GRAMMAR OF LOCKEAN CLAIMS 77 (1988).
58. JUJRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 56
(1989).
59. Id. at 57.
60. For the English Radicals, see HILL, supra note 33, at 286, 297. For Kant, see Immanuel
Kant, The Principle of Progress, in ETERNAL PEACE, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS 55,
59 (W. Hastie trans., World Peace Foundation 1914). Kant writes:
I will, therefore, venture to assume that as the human race is continually advancing in
civilization and culture as its natural purpose, so it is continually making progress for the
better in relation to the moral end of its existence, and that this progress, although it may
be sometimes interrupted, will never be entirely broken off or stopped.
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Like Luther and Locke, Kant had to articulate a relation between
the internalized sources of spiritual and moral knowledge, and the
bases of social order. He did this through a distinction between the
public and the private drawn differently than Luther's. Luther
identified privacy and inwardness with freedom of conscience and
with spirit, as opposed to the coercive and external realm of law that
still had its legitimate place. Kant's distinction, by contrast, ran
between the actions of the "private" citizen in the civil sphere, where
obedience was due to the monarch, and a "public" discursive freedom
where the individual was bound to articulate the dictates of his critical
conscience in the service of progressive Enlightenment. Thus Kant's
"private" realm relates primarily to the situation of the bureaucracy,
Luther's Obrigkeit,61 while his "public" sphere is similarly limited to
those with the education and wherewithal to publish their opinions on
critical issues. 62 The key point is that there is ultimately no possibility
of a coherent, purely individualist or private ethics: Even the most
famously autonomist of ethical systems must attend to questions of
civil authority and their attendant rituals.63
It is entirely consistent with the dilemma of autonomy that Kant's
expressions with regard to Jews are ambivalent. Kant praised the Jews
for "the sublimity of their moral law,"'  and especially for their
rejection of idols, while rejecting the ceremonialism and externality of
practice-oriented Jewish law.65 Judaism was thus simultaneously a
relic and an exemplar to be emulated; as in the English Reformation,
the Jew was a double other with polar valences, simultaneously
primitive and prophet. Echoes of the Lutheran Oldendorp's com-
bination of reliance on the supposedly universal and divinely revealed
moral aspects of Old Testament legislation with faith in the always
new guidance of inspired conscience may also be heard in this double
relation.
For Kant as well, the tension between freedom and authority thus
appeared once again in the question of the relation of the individual
to the state, of the Protestant believer to the God and Law of the
Israelites, of the human child to its parents, and of the past to the
61. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
62. See Geoffrey Gait Harpham, So ... What Is Enlightenment? An Inquisition Into
Modernity, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 524, 526-27 (1994).
63. Much as the most anti-idolatrist textualism ends up relying on "[tihe text or word [as]
no less a sign than the graven image or statue .... "GOODRICH, supra note 8, at 42.
64. Jacques Derrida, Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German, 22 NEW LITERARY
HIsT. 39, 69 (Moshe Ron trans., 1991) (citing Kant's The Critique of Moral Judgment).
65. See IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WrrHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 116
(Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson eds. & trans., 1960) ("The Jewish faith was, in its
original form, a collection of mere statutory laws.., really not a religion at all . [and]
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future. His definition of Enlightenment was addressed to the last two
of these relations: "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his
self-incurred immaturity.' ,66 In an early essay on pedagogy, Kant
elaborated on both this notion of "immaturity" and the possibility of
emergence from it by drawing a distinction between human and
animal nature:
Humans are the only creature that must be educated .... Dis-
cipline transforms animality into humanity. An animal is
everything it is through its instinct; an alien reason has prepared
everything for it already. Humans, however, require their own
reason. Man has no instinct, and must plan out his behavior on
his own. Because he is not immediately able to do this, coming
into the world unformed, others must do it for him.67
Taking the two quotes together implies the ideal of an eventual
transcendance of childlike dependence. By implication, Kant looks
forward to a time when every human person will always already be
fully independent and enlightened, free of both the ontogenetic
dependency period of individual childhood and the phylogenetic
limitations of the period of species-wide immaturity. Kant looks
forward to the time when the idea that "every rational being exists as
an end in himself" 68 will be a realized fact and not just an exemplary
assertion. In the meantime, "others must do it for him." That
diagnosis leaves us in the Kantian double bind, which asserts both
humanity's essentially rational and hence self-responsible nature on
the one hand, and the immaturity of both the individual child and the
species in history on the other.
This section has explored two interconnected themes. One is the
revival, invigoration, and expansion of the early Christian idea of
self-rule as a cornerstone of both Protestant hermeneutics and
Protestant ethics. This ideal was carried forward and developed into
classical liberal philosophy by figures such as Locke and Kant. The
second theme is the sometimes explicit, often displaced attempt to
understand the relation of Christianity to Judaism on the one hand as
that of advanced child to benighted father, and on the other as
heralding the triumph of individual spirit over carnal and engendered
matter. Both of these themes were to inform the modernist theories
of Jewish intellectuals such as Freud, who suffered and enjoyed the
66. JOHN BRENKMAN, STRAIGHT MALE MODERN 153 (1993) (citing Immanuel Kant's An
Answer to the Question: "What Is Enlightenment?").
67. IMMANUEL KANT, Uber die Padagogik, in 10 IMMANUEL KANT'S WERKE 379, 383
(Gustav Hartenstein ed., Leipzig, Modes und Baumann 1839) (translation mine).
68. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 52 (Robert Paul
Wolff ed. & Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1969) (1785).
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truncated process of Jewish emancipation into liberal West European
society.
FREUD: ON THE SIDEWALK
In this section of the Article, I examine three sources shaping
Freud's books about the sociology of religion and
civilization-including The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and Its
Discontents, Moses and Monotheism, and most coherently Totem and
Taboo.69 The first of these sources is a Victorian anthropology itself
shaped substantially both by the first waves of reception of the idea
of humans' primate ancestry and by the notion of England as the
pinnacle of a species-wide teleology toward civilization.7" The second
is Freud's own radical insistence on law and culture as constraints
upon "animal" drives inherited by humans from evolutionary
forebears. The third is the possibility of, and need for, integration of
Jews within a bourgeois, Christian-dominated fin-de-si6cle Western
Europe. As I will show, for Freud this last concern seemed in turn to
require a reckoning of the respective places of Judaism and Chris-
tianity in the narrative of the species's struggle to reconcile itself to
civilization. Throughout, Freud consistently assumed a hierarchical,
developmental dualism in which language is separate
from-simultaneously secondary and superior to-animal nature.
More precisely, these works rely on the theory of the "primal
horde." According to this theory, and by analogy with the notion of
social organization among modern gorillas current when Freud wrote,
the original form of the human group consisted of a single, dominant
male, whom Freud calls "the Father," all of the adult females as his
"wives," to whom he had exclusive sexual access, and the subordinate
junior males, who had no sexual access to females.
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together,
killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the
patriarchal horde .... The violent primal father had doubtless
been the feared and envied model of each one of the company
of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished
their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a
portion of his strength .... this memorable deed ... was the
69. SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (James Strachey ed. & trans., Norton
1961) (1927) [hereinafter FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION]; SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (James Strachey ed. & trans., Norton 1961) (1930) [hereinafter CIVILIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS]; SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM (Katherine Jones trans.,
Vintage 1939) [hereinafter MOSES AND MONOTHEISM]; SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO
(James Strachey ed. & trans., Norton 1950) (1913) [hereinafter TOTEM AND TABOO].
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beginning of so many things-of social organization, of moral
restrictions and of religion.
In remorseful, unconscious commemoration of this deed, the sons
banded together as a brotherhood of fellows and bound themselves
to be ruled henceforth by the moral, internalized workings of a law
attributed to the now-dead Father.
As a feminist commentator has pointed out, Freud explicitly refers
to Moses and Monotheism as the story of "a sort of social
contract."72 In fact, Freud's hypothetical reconstruction presents "his
accounts of the original pact as (stories) about the genesis of
civilization., 7 3 Yet at least two senses of this word "civilization" are
operative here. On one hand it is human society tout court, what
separates us from the gorillas-in Freud's story, the moral-legal
aftereffects of having actually killed the Father and then experiencing
remorse. On the other hand, civilization is European civilization, with
very precise notions of civility, BUrgerlichkeit. In this second sense,
commentators understand Freud's theory as responding to his own
situation between Jewishness and civility.74 Building on those
discussions, this section will emphasize further Freud's progressivist
reliance on his own depictions of the childlike primitivity of the past
in which God was invented, combined with his faith in the "God
Logos" to fulfill human wishes "very gradually, only in the un-
foreseeable future, and for a new generation of men."7
At the same time, I want to anticipate my sketch below of an
alternate "legal anthropology" by reference to an alternative to
Freud's foundation myth of an imposition of law upon the animal will
of early (male) homo sapiens. This alternative starts from a view of
law in its largest sense-what we usually call "culture"-as human
adaptation.76 It may not be immediately obvious how radical a
revision of psychoanalytic assumptions about "nature" and "culture"
71. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 176.
72. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 41 (1989); see also BROWN, supra note 1.
73. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 24 (1988).
74. The classic statement of this thesis is JOHN CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY (1974),
which treats Freud along with Marx and L6vi-Strauss as exemplars of the production of modern
social theory in the encounter between traditional Jewishness and Protestant modernity. More
broadly, Cuddihy's book is a small part of a substantial literature on the relation between
Jewishness and psychoanalysis, including DAVID BAKAN, SIGMUND FREUD AND THE JEWISH
MYSTICAL TRADITION (1958); PETER GAY, FREUD, JEWS, AND OTHER GERMANS (1978);
DENNIS KLEIN, JEWISH ORIGINS OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT (1985); PAUL, supra
note 20; LA PSYCHANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE JUIVE? (Jean-Jacques Rassial & Adelie
Rassial eds., 1981); YOSEF HAIM YERUSHALMI, FREUD'S MOSES: JUDAISM TERMINABLE AND
INTERMINABLE (1992).
75. FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, supra note 69, at 69.
76. See generally PAUL, supra note 20.
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(analogous to some extent to "the unconscious" and "the conscious"
realms of the individual mind) are called for on the basis of this
alternative anthropology. Here I only allude to this alternative in
order to stress that the assumption that language is an imposition on
the animal nature of men is by no means inevitable. Such an
assumption provides one powerful way of explaining the pathos
behind Freud's odd myth. This is the approach of the psychoanalytic
theorist Jacques Lacan in his summation of the anthropological
question haunting Freud:
[H]ow can this system of signifiers without which no incarnation
of either truth or justice is possible, how can this literal logos
take hold of an animal who doesn't need it and doesn't care
about it-since it doesn't at all concern his needs?...
How can this have taken hold, how does man enter into this
law which is foreign to him and which as an animal he has
nothing to do with? It was to explain this that Freud constructed
the myth of the murder of the father.77
My contention, however, is that we will lose an absolutely critical
purchase on the analysis of law, language, and morality coming out of
this founding myth of psychoanalysis if we assume (as Lacan's quote
suggests)78 that Freud constructed the myth in order to explain a
human complex that he had objectively noted. Rather, I want to
suggest that part of Freud's emphasis on the Law of the Father
(initially tyrannical and then repressive) and his concern for
explaining the alienation and struggle at the origin of human society
and of civility are inseparable from his cultural-historical situation in
between Jewishness and the law of the bourgeois individual.
In the sociological texts, Freud consistently relies on the assumption
that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny-that the pattern of develop-
ment from conception toward normal human adulthood bears a
relation of congruence to the evolution of our species.79 The
77. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: THE PSYCHOSES 1955-56, at 242
(Jaques-Alain Miller ed. & Russell Griff trans., 1993).
78. Although Lacan could also be saying that Freud constructed a certain story in order to
explain what was for Freud a conundrum about language and animality. In any case, my
intention is not to rate Freud, Lacan, or anyone else on progressive scales of enlightenment, but
to highlight key instances of a lingering dualist metaphysics separating sign systems from reality.
79. Alternatively, Freud posits the reverse relationship-that the primitive is childlike. Both
sets of belief complexes, the primitive and the childish, are present in the adult in "repressed"
form:
An uncanny experience occurs either when repressed infantile complexes have been
revived by some impression, or when the primitive beliefs we have surmounted seem once
more to be confirmed .... When we consider that primitive beliefs are most intimately
connected with infantile complexes, and are, in fact, based upon them, we shall not be
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traditional Jewish principle that "later generations are inferior in
wisdom to earlier generations""° could only have seemed an
anathema to modems. For Freud, the theory of the troubled
relationship between human animality and human culture is thus part
and parcel of individual psychology in culture; both are agonistic
processes in which normal development can be separated out from
pathology. Our ancestors are seen as somehow weaker than we in
their immature cultural development, while the proper evolution of
civilization is "comparable to the normal maturation of the in-
dividual."81
Several aspects of Freud's theorizing relevant to the relations
among law and religion are directly linked to this reductive as-
sumption of a normal individual development toward adulthood
corresponding to the teleological but conflicted advance of the entire
species: First, there is an important consequence for the ideal of
individual autonomy that Freud shares with liberal theory of law and
identity.82 Freud's dream of achieving autonomy contrasts, however,
with the liberal doctrines that proceed from the assumption that it has
already been achieved. Blackstone's definition of civil liberty is
exemplary in this regard.83
Given that classical liberal theory is indeed predicated on a rhetoric
that assumes adult male autonomy as a condition already achieved,
the attractions of Freudian narratives of doubt and struggle in the
twentieth-century crisis of liberalism are readily understood. What
should not be missed is that the assumption of autonomy, albeit as a
goal rather than a given, remains in place.
SIGMUND FREUD, The "Uncanny", in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 368, 403 (James Strachey ed.,
1959).
80. Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter- Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 853 (1993).
81. CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 69, at 52. Freud's analogy between the
species-historic development from animal to human on one hand, and the individual's
development from animal to human on the other, can be compared with the doctrinal and
folkloric Christian accounts of Christianity developing out of Judaism in history and in the
development of the individual Christian child. See CLAUDINE FABRE-VASSAS, LA B11TE
SINGULIERE: LES JUIFS, LES CHRETIENS ET LE COCHON (1994).
The "individuals" under discussion here are all male; Freud "was concerned to chart the path
from infancy to civilized adulthood, a model applicable only to men." NAOMI SCHEMAN,
ENGENDERINGS: CONSTRUCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE, AUTHORrrY, AND PRIVILEGE 47 (1993).
82. See generally Robin West, Laws, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism
and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986). Of C.B. Macpherson's
seven propositions describing the liberal "political theory of possessive individualism," the first
two are sufficient to establish an agenda (how to establish freedom) that Freudian
psychoanalysis shares with liberal political theory: "(i) What makes a man human is freedom
from dependence on the wills of others. (ii) Freedom from dependence on others mean freedom
from any relations with others except those relations that the individual enters voluntarily with
a view to his own interest." C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE IN-
DIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 263 (1962).
83. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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Linked to this changed view of autonomy, the concern for the
transcendence of religion (as a childish aspect of earlier civilizations)
in The Future of an Illusion is sharpened in Civilization and Its
Discontents into a concern for the dangerous process of civilizational
maturation to a healthy, rational adulthood. The transcendence of
cultural filiation (freeing ourselves from these "ignorant ancestors")
8 4
becomes as necessary to the collective as the successful resolution of
the Oedipus Complex is necessary to the individual.
Old age-that part of the life cycle beyond the period in which one
is the parent of dependent children-seems to be excluded from
consideration of the relations between ontogeny and phylogeny in
these various texts. Partly this is because the urgency of old people's
sexual "drives" is diminished and therefore what Nietzsche would call
their "will" is lessened, making them less problematic and less
interesting in terms of the integration of the human "animal" into
society. Partly as well, this is because the old in whatever time are
tainted with the ignorance of ancestors. Consistent with this, Freud
fails to articulate how language, culture, and the symbolic order not
only constrain the individual organism with its drives, but expand the
possibilities of identification beyond the individual organism. Freud
takes the boundaries of the organism as a certain datum indicative of
normalcy: "Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain
than the feeling of our self, of our own ego."8'5
In contrast it must be remembered that generation is not only about
birth, not only about childhood and the initial dependency. Indeed,
Freud's analogy between an assumption of civilizationa! progress
(necessary even if not teleologically guaranteed) and a normative
description of the dangerous path from dependent infancy to autono-
mous adulthood has as its complement a wholly negative account of
the "instinctual desire for death, destruction, and 'stillness,' " which
he sees as giving "rise to our aggressive inclinations against both
ourselves and others."86 Freud expresses this desire for stillness as
destructive because he views the death instinct as a negative teleology
of individual and society, the counterpart or "underside" to "the
instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever larger
units., 87 By contrast, one could argue-and the ethnographic record
84. "The form wherein the old Jews were happy no longer offers us any shelter," LETTERS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 318 (Ernst L. Freud, ed. & Tania Stem & James Stern, trans., Basic Books
1960), cited in Daniel Boyarin, "You May Not Tell the Boys": The Diaspora Politics of a
Bitextual Jew (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); "These ancestors of ours were
far more ignorant than we are," FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, supra note 69, at 33.
85. CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 69, at 12.
86. West, supra note 82, at 854.
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makes available-an account showing that the desire for life and the
desire for death are only destructively paired from the perspective of
the autonomous individual limited chronologically at birth and death.
Within many cultural formations, including Jewishness and those
called "primitive," the problem of organismic extinction has been
addressed (not necessarily "solved") through a construction of
transgenerational identity inseparable from the ironic and powerful
construction of personhood in and through language.8 8 In such
cultures, the possibility of dealing with death in this way relates first
of all to the absence of an ideal of individual autonomy, and second
to the absence of a metaphysics that places language and symbolism
at a stage or level ontologically separate and "less real" but "more
advanced" than biology or reality, but in any case as a constraint on
"nature."
The consequences of such a dualist metaphysics are clear in Jacques
Lacan's thought. In the Lacanian elaboration of Freud, all the mother
does is give birth and nurse.89 She has no tongue, only das Ding, the
primal object, the maternal breast.9" We might ask: Doesn't she sing
and talk to the child all the while? And if so, couldn't her singing and
talking be as fundamental to the supposed original unity between
mother and child as is nursing?91 The assumption that speech is a
matter of separation rather than connection, overlaid on the as-
sumption that Father separates the child from Mother, in effect
assigns nature and animality to Mother, language and law to Father,
and thus reinforces the metaphysics of language as ontologically
separate, posterior, and "higher." Inasmuch as Jewishness, like
primitivity, fails to realize such a progressive development, this
metaphysical psychoanalysis of language and identity further supports
the common association of fin-de-si~cle culture between Jewishness,
woman, and the body on one hand, and Christianity, masculinity, and
88. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE IN FAMILY GROUPS (Jack Goody ed., 1958).
89. Thus Foucault lucidly summarizes Lacan: The father "creates the distance along which
will develop the scansion of presences and absences, the speech whose initial form is based on
constraints, and finally, the relationship of the signifier to the signified which not only gives rise
to the structure of language but also to the exclusion and symbolic transformation of repressed
material." Michel Foucault, The Father's "No", in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE,
supra note 6, at 68, 81-82 (emphasis added).
90. See 7 JACQUES LACAN, LE SMINAIRE DE JACQUES LACAN: L'ETHIQUE DE LA
PSYCHANALYSE 1959-1960, at 83 (1986).
91. See the discussion of maternal subjectivity in JESSICA BENJAMIN, LIKE SUBJECTS, LOVE
OBJECTS 19 (1995) ("[Viiewing the earliest experience of the mother from her perspective
breaks up th[e] myth [of a 'harmonious' maternal ideal], confronting her with the paradoxical
necessity of recognizing, while not yet 'knowing,' the strange newborn who was once part of her
body. Indeed, the struggle for recognition.... helps foster a symbolic space within the early
maternal dyad between mother and child - a process previously conceptualized exclusively in
terms of the oedipal father-son rivalry.") (emphasis added). Note, however, that this formulation
preserves a primary association between symbolization and "struggle."
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spirit or language on the other.92 More to the point at this stage of
the discussion, assigning language a secondary if rarified status
obviates the possibility of a "real," rather than "illusory," relation to
the dead through language.
The very terms of Freud's masculinist origin myth thus block a
more nuanced and contingent understanding of the relations among
generation, death, identification, and perpetuation. Quite the contrary:
His materialist progressivism provides a different version of the
double bind encountered in Kant.93 In this version, what is older
must be transcended because it was more "ignorant" than we are and
it was "childlike," yet at the same time the primal animality at the
origin of humanity remains the core driving the human animal. Thus,
when the sons kill the Father, acquire access to the women, and
institute the Law of the Father in remorse for their act, they also gain
access to "the pure erotic bliss of the father viewed as primordial."94
Thus the acquisition of infantile eros would also be inseparable from
civilization, from acquisition of the internalized Law of the Father.
There is a patent contradiction in this schema: The acquisition of that
which is "primordial," instinctive, prior to law and language, is
available through and only through that act that results in inheritance
of the Law. Eros and civilization are a package deal.
As suggested above, the insertion of a Pauline discourse against the
shackles of the Law into a Roman imperial framework guarantees a
regime of perpetual Western disease that can be characterized as the
pathetic search for a law without Law, or the recognition of the need
for law (to control "men" in "society," expressed by the notion that
"'crimes forbidden by law are crimes which many men have a natural
propensity to commit' ")95 combined with the suspicion that any Law
is illegitimate. Hardly surprising, then, that a perpetual ambivalence
(not an eternal hatred) toward Jews on the one hand and toward
92. Pierre Legendre refuses this metaphysics, insisting that human life must be (linguistically)
"instituted" and that genealogy is inescapable:
In any culture, it is not enough to produce human flesh; it is still necessary to institute it
for it to live, for life to reproduce. To institute the subject is to institute life. Because it is
bound to the problematic of language, the juridical system is, originarily [dans son principe]
burdened by the idea of genealogy.
Pierre Legendre, The Other Dimension of Law, 16 CARDOZo L. REV. 943, 953 (1995). This ack-
nowledgment, I contend, is linked to Legendre's recognition of the importance of Jewish dif-
ference-not, I would insist, because Jewishness is a "chosen" culture, but because of the signal
persistence of the Jewish anti-metaphysics in the heart of the Christian West.
93. This double bind may be paraphrased as the command to "be true to your father's law,
which consists of being true only to yourself." For a lucid elaboration of a model rebellion
against this double bind, see the discussion of the Schreber case in ERIC SANTNER, MY OWN
PRIVATE GERMANY (1995).
94. Jacques Lacan, Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar, in TELEVISION 89
(Denis Hollier et al. eds. & trans., 1990).
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genealogy on the other would be constitutive of the West and the
subject of special awareness on the part of those who attempt to
escape from the presumed parochialism of Jewish genealogical
community and Law into the presumed freedom and autonomy of the
West.
Freud is thus particularly invested in the general sense of the
paradox of Law's illegitimacy. Again and again he tries to reconcile
the notion of a founding violence with the notion of functionality. On
one hand there is the hint that taboos are per se bad ("there can be
no race and no level of culture which has escaped the ill-effect of
taboo"9 6), and there is a repeated association of "primitives and
neurotics" as those who observe taboos. On the other hand there is
a functionalist counter-tendency to explain why taboos effectively
manage regulation of social tensions. In any case, in Totem and Taboo
Freud goes on to the "necessary" supposition that taboos
are prohibitions of primaeval antiquity which were at some time
externally imposed upon a generation of primitive men; they
must, that is to say, no doubt have been impressed on them
violently by the previous generation .... [The persistence of the
taboo indicates that] the original desire to do the prohibited thing
must also still persist among the tribes concerned.97
Overcoming the primitive and neurotic handicap of taboo, or at least
revealing the violence of its historical imposition so that men can
rationally review the functionality of different kinds of interdictions,
would thus provide on the one hand a therapeutic path to normalcy
for Everyman and a particular resolution of the compulsive taboos
that presumably drive the anti-Semite: Totem and Taboo can be read
as encompassing the "legal" obsessions of both anti-Semite and Jew,
which is the only way to solve Freud's particular problem.98
If we remain with Lacan's powerful reformulation of the
anthropological dilemma, stated as the attempted if failed solution to
96. Id. at 30.
97. Id. at 40.
98. In this respect Freud can be read also as carrying forward Nietzsche's anti-anti-Semitism,
which is no defense of Jews:
Human history would be a dull and stupid thing without the intelligence furnished by its
impotents. Let us begin with the most striking example. Whatever else has been done to
damage the powerful and great of this earth seems trivial compared with what the Jews
have done, that priestly people who succeeded in avenging themselves on their enemies
and oppressors by radically inverting all their values, that is, by an act of the most spiritual
vengeance. This was a strategy entirely appropriate to a priestly people in whom vindic-
tiveness had gone mostly underground.
NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 167 (Francis Golffing
trans., 1956). Thematic links between Nietzsche's account of "repression, compensation and
sublimation" were remarked on as "startlingly Freudian" by Nietzsche's English translator in
1956. Franics Golffing, Preface to id., at ix.
368
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a problem that Freud merely acutely "recognized," we fail to respond
to the dimension of projection involved in Freud's origin myth.
"Projection," here, not in any technical psychoanalytic sense, but in
a reading back from what Freud considered to be the normal
(sometimes even "real")99 family structure. In the connection
between the general reliance on the set of relations, repressions, and
desires called the Oedipal Complex on the one hand and the account
of the origins of law, the clan structure, and religion in Totem and
Taboo on the other, there is a transposition of the family order of
father-mother-son, read back into the founding event of the killing of
the father that transformed the primal horde into a totemic brother-
hood. Thus, on the one fateful occasion when desire erupted into
action and instituted law as a result, the subordinate males of the
horde were not simply acting animalistically, but in line with a desire
that Freud imputes backwards from the normalized, bourgeois
Oedipal family."° The founding repression, which results in the
illusion of the totemic Father, is an exceptional moment that is at the
same time "called for," anticipated as necessary for progress. The
causality works backwards and forwards; the genealogy in which
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is mirrored by a teleology in which
phylogeny anticipates ontogeny.
Consider this as the logic of a dream, working backward and
forward, yet impossible in either direction (the necessary institution
of an impossible law). It may not seem odd then that the following
recollection appears in Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams:
99. See, e.g., TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 21 (discussing relations between
primitive "son-in-law" and "mother-in-law" in a manner that universalizes modem European
kinship categories, and simultaneously obscures fundamental questions of what genealogy "in
law" can mean).
100. Jay Geller notes that "anthropologists are all but unanimous in their denial of what
Freud found absolutely necessary, namely, his claims for the historicity of the primal horde." Jay
Geller, A Paleontological View of Freud's Study of Religion: Unearthing the Leitfossil
Circumcision, 13 MOD. JUDAISM 49, 65 (1993). Despite this denial, "Freud's haunting theory
entered subtly into the thinking of many anthropologists, including Malinowski, R6heim,
L6vi-Strauss and more recently Robin Fox." CHRIS KNIGHT, BLOOD RELATIONS:
MENSTRUATION AND THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE 55 (1991). Some scholars may understand
Freud's work on patricide not as a historical hypothesis, but as a deliberate articulation of the
(unconscious?) myths his own culture needed to tell itself in order to explain that culture's
particular neuroses. This reading would suggest that, according to Freud himself, "there never
was a father enjoyment, who was murdered. We each write the law and retroactively attribute
it to father-enjoyment, who must have existed and whom we must have killed." Interview with
Professor Jeanne L. Schroeder, Cardozo Law School (Apr. 15, 1996). A similar understanding
may animate a revisionist fable in the same genre as Totem and Taboo, such as Arthur Jacobson
offers us. Arthur J. Jacobson, Legal Emotion: The Women's Story in Totem and Taboo, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139 (1995). I find, however, that the tendency of Freud and Lacan to speak
of Oedipal development in universal terms militates against the claim that they understood the
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At that point I was brought up against the event in my youth
whose power was still being shown in all these emotions and
dreams. I may have been ten or twelve years old, when my father
began to take me with him on his walks and reveal to me in his
talk his views upon things in the world we live in. Thus it was, on
one such occasion, that he told me a story to show how much
better things were now than they had been in his days. "When I
was a young man," he said, "I went for a walk one Saturday in
the streets of your birthplace; I was well dressed, and had a new
fur cap on my head. A Christian came up to me and with a single
blow knocked off my cap into the mud and shouted: 'Jew! Get
off the pavement!"' "And what did you do?" I asked. "I went
into the roadway and picked up my cap," was his quiet reply.
This struck me as unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong
man who was holding the little boy by the hand. I contrasted this
situation with another which fitted my feelings better: the scene
in which Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear
before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans.
Ever since that time Hannibal had had a place in my fan-
tasies.''
Now imagine the two scenes of recollection, one on top of the
other, blended as in a dream. In one of them Sigmund Freud, a child,
is walking with his father Jakob Freud, who appears to the child as "a
big, strong man." As the two walk along, the father's narrative of his
youth superimposes other images onto the first scene; the two come
together in the "unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong man."
The father, reduced to a "young man," does not stand his ground
when challenged by the anti-Semite, and is displaced from Sigmund's
side. He abandons the sidewalk, leaving Sigmund alone and
unprotected, at the mercy of the anti-Semite; alternatively, the
protective father disappears, to be replaced by a more powerful and
fundamentally hostile male. The assurance that "things are better
now" appears as a failed attempt to place the two events in proper
sequence, to reassure the child Sigmund that he will not be challenged
by an anti-Semite in turn when he is a young man, but the ambivalent
Law of the Father undermines this progressive reassurance. Freud's
confused identifications with his childhood self, with his father and
with the anti-Semite relate also to a contradiction inherent in the
axiom that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Phylogenetic progress
suggests that it is the old man one needs to transcend, while
ontogenetic progress suggests to the contrary that it is the immature
101. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 196 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,
Basic Books 1953) (1932).
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child one needs to transcend. In allegorical accounts centering on the
progressive redemption of the individual self, the corrupt and
superannuated old man cannot be correlated to the old man who has
successfully travelled the pilgrimage of life, nor can the innocent child
be correlated with the immature child at the mercy of incestuous"
and parricidal drives. Absent a transgenerational, "cyclical"/historical
emphasis on related selves that identify through and with one another,
we fall back on the atemporal, idealized, hypostasized notion of the
autonomous and self-redeeming moral self with all of the inherent
paradoxes just suggested.
There is thus a particularly consequential entanglement in the
situation of a Jew who (for whatever reasons) believes in this notion
of the murder and subsequent Law of the Father on the one hand,
and who is also faced with anti-Semitism on the other hand. The
child's supposed desire to kill the father is actualized in the
anti-Semite's hatred of both himself and his father, and this "or-
ganizes the subjective position of the child."1" At the same time,
the hostility toward the father is justified inasmuch as, in the superim-
posed recollection, the father has been transformed into an
anti-Semite threatening the betrayed child. The child's supposed
hostility toward the father and the anti-Semite's hostility toward
father and child are elaborated into a generalized theory of oppres-
sion by the father followed by revolt against the father. The
evaluation is ambivalent: The father was indiscriminate, promiscuously
possessive (the way "animals" are), yet our rebellion was itself an
unfilial act; those things happened in the old days not now, yet each
son and each father in every generation replays this scene.
The ambivalence is not to be condemned. In a sense, by telling the
story with its unwished-for and unanticipated disappointing ending,
Jakob Freud wounded his young son. As Hans Loewald describes the
theory of the Oedipal relationship, the father was the child's "protec-
tor, as well as the castrator if his authority and predominance were
challenged."1" Of course, the passive "were challenged" presumes
102. The repressive "no" of the father relates, of course, not only to weaning but to the
incest taboo, posited as the interdiction of a fundamental impulse. See 7 JACQUES LACAN, supra
note 90, at 81-85, 92. If language prevents son-mother incest, why don't non-human male infants
routinely copulate with their mothers? I am led to suspect that, much as I have been arguing
that the "Law of the Father" is a discourse produced by Protestant autonomism, "the incestuous
impulse" and its "interdiction" by the properly-functioning, lawgiving bourgeois Father is an
effect of Freud's flight from the disturbing Heimlichkeit of Jewishness. On the ambivalence of
the term Heimlich, see FREUD, The "Uncanny", supra note 79, at 368.
103. JEAN-JACQUES RASSIAL, Dispersion!, in LA PSYCHOANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE
JUIRE?, supra note 72, at 12, 20.
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a challenge from ego (the child), but real-world fathers often are
challenged by those with greater power than they. Loewald's formula-
tion suggests that the father can become a castrated castrator if his
"authority and predominance" are challenged by something other than
ego-here, the anti-Semite.15
Freud lacked on the one hand any overt political critique of cultural
difference." 6 Furthermore, while he associated "in his essential
nature" as a member of the Jewish people, he denied that he could
"express that essence clearly in words."'0 7 Nor did he work through
what such an ambivalent collective identification might produce. All
this is not to gainsay, but merely to qualify as a caution, the sugges-
tion by two acute recent critics that Jewishness constitutes "an identity
which is not one."'0 8 This follows their articulation of an insight they
attribute to Freud, I0 9 that the birth of a human child sets the stage
for a lifelong intermingling of dependence and autonomy.10 This
idea certainly helps get us closer to an effective critique of the liberal
construction of the autonomous human male, yet it does not appears
to me as an idea that consistently informs Freud's theoretical specula-
tions. As suggested above, the notion of the Law of the Father is
instead troubled by a dreamlike inconsistency. Freud remains almost
entirely silent on the subalternity of his generation's Jewish fathers.
As a result, in order to produce an account that simultaneously
explains Freud's own ambivalent feelings toward his father and the
anti-Semite's hostility, Totem and Taboo produces a universal account
of the original "badness" of the Father and the guilty taboos that
persist after the act of murder that founds the Law.'
105. Insofar as it is a corrective, John Brenkman is right to claim that "Freud's long
unhealed wound at the hand of his father was not some primal paternal castration threat but
rather the dismay he felt as a child upon hearing his father tell of being bullied." JOHN
BRENKMAN, STRAIGHT MALE MODERN 110 (1993). Brenkman's point is that Freud's theory
responded not only to a hypothetical universal situation, but to an event in his own life that
arose out of the structures of domination and identity within which he lived. I am trying to show
here the complex ways in which the father's disappointing response could nevertheless have
been received, given those same structures, as an "unmanning" of the child.
106. See the brief passage in Civilization and Its Discontents where he announces what will,
in effect, be a central doctrinal tenet of Lvi-Strauss's structuralism, that the anthropologist has
no place or authority to criticize or to offer a therapeutic analysis within his own cultural sphere.
See CIVILIZATION, supra note 69, at 110 (demurring from the claim to be able to diagnose "co-
mmunal neuroses"); see also Carl E. Schorschke, Politics and Patricide in Freud's Interpretation
of Dreams, in FIN-DE-SICLE VIENNA: POLITICS AND CULTURE 181 (1980).
107. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at xxxi.
108. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, Le Peuple Juif Ne Rdve Pas, in LA
PSYCHANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE JUIVE?, supra note 74, at 85.
109. The attribute is to Freud in general, evidently, since their essay contains few citations.
110. LA PSYCHANALYSE EST-ELLE UNE HISTOIRE JUNVE?, supra note 74, at 65.
111. Carole Pateman criticizes the psychoanalytic feminist critic Juliet Mitchell for asserting
that the Law of the Father only arises after the murder of the father. PATEMAN, supra note 72,
at 42 (citing JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM (1974)). Pateman insists to
the contrary that the Law of the Father was in effect while the Father yet lived. The dispute
372
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Part of the general ethnographic character associating primitives
with neurotics in Freud's view is a linkage of words with power,
112
a fantasy that Freud assumes is overcome in the progression of
civilization as in the development of the normal individual.113 What
is real is affect, and affect is of two kinds: pain and pleasure. 4
Freud extends from the notion of the divergent principles of pain and
pleasure a notion of a mixture of feelings of affection and hostility
toward the dead. He assumes that these can only be dealt with by
primitives (as by neurotics) in an adversarial way, as a conflict of
pleasant and repellent associations, in which one of these two affects
must ultimately be suppressed by the other. Mourning the death of an
elder toward whom one had felt ambivalent crowds out expressions
of hostility, which are then projected into a construction of the dead
as "demons."'1 5 On the other hand civilization has meliorated this
conflicted relation to the dead: "through the course of ages. . . there
has been an extraordinary diminution in ambivalence."1 6 Having
posited an original ambivalence and a progressive diminution of it,
could Freud have admitted to ambivalence toward his parents, let
alone toward an explicit connection of that ambivalence to the
paradox of their familial power and social powerlessness? Significant
here is the lack on Freud's part of any recognition that these
ambivalences can be dealt with, ritualized in any other way than
conflict and repression-as they are in various groups' "ceremonies of
ambivalence."
117
The ritualization of ambivalence is only possible, of course, if words
do have power. So, however, is psychoanalytic therapy, the "talking
arises from emphasis on different moments in Freud's account. Freud argues that while the
Father yet lived, he ruled as a tyrant. Insofar as Freud is stipulating that this primal horde is the
elementary form of human group existence, this paternal tyranny would be regarded as the
"natural" baseline. The other way to read Totem and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism, and
Civilization and Its Discontents-Lacan's way-is to emphasize the law of the absent Father after
his murder as a just-so-story attempting to explain why there is any symbolic authority at all.
Accepting either of these stories as a plausible "scientific" reconstruction seems to rely on a
dualist notion of the human organism as composed of a troubled union between body and spirit.
112. See TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 69. Similarly, Freud describes magic as "mi-
staking an ideal connection for a real one." Id. at 99.
113. See MANFRED POHLEN & MARGARETE BAUTZ-HOLZHERR, DAS FREUDSCHE SUBJECT
IN DER ANALYSES 277-79 (1911) (pointing out relation between general tendency toward a
"past-burying" progressive temporality and allegorical interpretation in Freud).
114. Freud's analysis here is thus compatible with the psychological basis of Locke's
voluntarism. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54; cf Alan Bass, Primary Perversion and
Universal Law, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 1293 (1995) (drawing on writings of Hans Loewald,
especially Loewald's criticism of tendency toward objectivist realism in Freud, to argue against
reading of Freud as mechanically objectivist and in favor of reading of Freud's thought as
contingent and exploratory).
115. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 80.
116. Id. at 83.
117. See Ronald Cohen, Age and Culture as Theory, in AGE AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
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cure.""' 8 Freud clearly knew that words have power, yet he is
repeatedly undone by his commitment to a realist materialism. When
he sets out to explain the origins of a dualistic belief in "soul" on the
one hand and "body" on the other, 9 he replaces that belief with a
new dualism, in which symbolic organizations (such as totemic clans)
can be reduced to displacement of "physical drives" or posited
historical events.120
Related to the simplistic dichotomy of pleasure and pain in one's
affect toward the dead is a curious analytic lapse, a subjectivism
through which the "reality" of the other (in this case an ancestor,
alive then dead) is treated as dependent upon the existence of the one
who perceives that other. Thus Freud breaks down our awareness of
the other into "perception" of her (when she is alive) and "memory"
of her (when she is dead, no longer present). 21 Freud thus adds to
his insistence on an irreconcilable ambivalence vis-A-vis any deceased
loved one a denial of the possibility of a "real" continued relation
beyond the organismic dissolution of that other. Unable to reconcile
ambivalence toward the dead, primitives and neurotics refuse to
acknowledge that the dead are no longer "real." If this is accepted, it
is not necessary to accept the fable of patricide in Totem and Taboo,
or even to hear it told as a parable, in order to understand the claim
that, inspired by our guilty feelings after that father's death (but why
not the mother's?), "we write the law in the Father's name so that we
can pretend that he is still alive.' 122 This claim is plausible only if we
accept the reification of a bright line separating the other's "being
alive" from his "being dead."'"
118. See Jacques Lacan, Function and Field of Speech and Language, in JACQUES LACAN,
EcRITS: A SELECTION 33,44 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) ("For nobody is less demanding than
a psychoanalyst as to what provides the status of his action, which he himself is not far from
regarding as magical .... [Whereas actually] to impute to regression the reality of an actual
relation to the object amounts to projecting the subject into an alienating illusion that does no
more than echo an alibi of the psychoanalyst.").
119. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 116.
120. Freud's progressivism was not naive. By early 1938 he could write with bitter sarcasm,
"It was a real weight off the heart to find, in the case of the German people [as opposed to the
Italians and the Soviets], that retrogression into all but prehistoric barbarism can come to pass
independently of any progressive idea." MOSES AND MONOTHEISM,, supra note 69, at 67. Yet
the same anxiety that authorized his arrogation of an objectivized story of human origins was
tied to the compulsion to prove oneself civilized-an ordeal that, of course, was by no means
confined to Jews one generation removed from the Yiddish-speaking community.
121. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 117.
122. Jeanne Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and
Psychoanalysis, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 805,894 (1995). Goodrich's allusion to the sacrificial foun-
dation story may also be read in this light. See GOODRICH, supra note 8, at 94. ("In terms of
origin and source, the most explicit correlation between rationality and group membership is
found in the earliest depictions of lawful foundation in sacrifice or oedipal killing.").
123. In his summary of Daniel Paul Schreber's memoir, Freud notes that "[t]hrough the
whole of Schreber's book there runs the bitter complaint that God, being only accustomed to
intercourse with the dead, does not understand living men." Sigmund Freud, Psychoanalytic
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We could start instead from a supposition of anamnestic solidarity
and interdependence,124 such that when we remember him, he is
alive and perhaps also that when we forget him, we die. In fact, the
sharp division between the reality of the living and the memory of the
dead, let alone the further leap into an association of perception with
conscious awareness of the other and of memory with her unconscious
presence to us,1" is not a precultural given. To see the alterna-
tive-beginning with the assumption of connection rather than "real"
separation between the living and the dead-allows us to see once
again the contingency of Freud's assumption of the individual
organism as the starting point for analysis and to recall on the
contrary that not all symbolic orders start from and devolve back to
the bounded individual organism in this way."
Freud acknowledges toward the end of Totem and Taboo a problem
of collective psychic continuity, arising from the fact that his account
of law stemming from unconscious remorse for the killing of the
father necessitates unconscious guilt on the part of subsequent
generations that did not take part in that act.127 But a "collective
psyche" need only be posited within a theory grounded in the
assumption of the autonomous psychic framework of each immature
individual and of a presymbolic human essence onto which law and
language are imposed. Assuming that the ambivalent feelings toward
elders (physiological pain and pleasure) are likewise prelinguistic
sensations in Freud's understanding that ambivalence is not suscep-
tible to a creative symbolic negotiation, this hence results in the
unambivalent projective invention of a demon ancestor spirit
(expressing and associated solely with pain) to whom one is then
subject.
Moses and Monotheism especially suggests that both Judaism and
anti-Semitism constitute this kind of ancestral projection, a projection
that can be overcome only through greater powers of individual and
collective self-reflection. Moses and Monotheism reiterates the
father-murder thesis of Totem and Taboo with specific reference to
the origins of Judaism and Christianity. The problem of the collective
psyche reappears in Moses and Monotheism, where it is handled by
Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911),
in THREE CASE HISTORMES 83, 100 (Philip Rieff ed., Macmillan 1963). Freud himself, of course,
would not complain of a flaw in God, but the note is consistent with Freud's sense of the
unwarranted collusive power of religion and the dead.
124. See Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity, 25 TELOS 133 (1975).
125. See TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 117.
126. See Loewald, supra note 104, at 401-02 (stressing importance of striving for unity and
symbiosis as counterbalance to striving for self-differentiation); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law,
Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990).
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the suggestion that "the archaic heritage of mankind includes ...
memory traces of the experiences of former generations."1" In
Moses and Monotheism, the thesis of the murder of the Father is the
basis for the asserted collective murder of the Egyptian Moses, the
lawgiver.29 Here, however, the postulated sequence in Totem and
Taboo is transposed. In Moses and Monotheism the "father" is a
lawgiver of superior, imperial, and enlightened views1 30 whose
strictures are resented by the "savage Semites;' 131 they come to
"regret[] the murder of Moses and tr[y] to forget it.' 32 The story is
complicated by the postulation of a second Moses, associated with the
bloodthirsty and ritualistic Jahwism with which the Jewish mass is
actually more comfortable.'33 This suppression of the murder of
Moses was never fully effective, and ultimately, through mechanisms
Freud does not reveal, "a growing feeling of guiltiness ... [facilitated]
the return of the repressed material."'" This return of the repressed
produced the Prophetic attempt to return to the superior moral
quality of the original Mosaic teaching that "the Deity spurns sacrifice
and ceremonial; he demands only belief and a life of truth and justice
(Maat).' 131 This, then, is another version of the thesis of a Law
whose authority is grounded in poorly perceived or "unconscious"
remorse for the murder of a father figure.
Especially toward the end of Moses and Monotheism, Freud
discusses Judaism in two highly evaluative registers, intended as an
apologia and partial explanation of the persistence of Jewish
distinctiveness. On one hand, he stresses the extraordinary ethical
development of Mosaic (and then Prophetic, as opposed to
priestly/Jahwist) Judaism. As Daniel Boyarin suggests, this reinforced
a defense of Judaism as manly and disciplined in Kantian terms:
"Where the Jews have been accused of carnality and, therefore, of
being like women, Freud ... would demonstrate that they are more
spiritual, and more rational, than the others, and therefore more
masculine than the accusers themselves. 1 36 On the other hand the
Jews remain distinct and are obviously not generally regarded from
"outside" as being highly advanced in these Kantian terms. Thus
128. MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 69, at 127.
129. See id. at 57.
130. See id. at 22.
131. See id. at 58.
132. Id.
133. Daniel Boyarin suggests that this is an effective if covert "representation of the
distinction between German Jews and their embarrassingly primitive relatives, the Ostjuden."
BOYARIN, supra note 17, at 267.
134. See MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 69, at 108.
135. See id. at 63.
136. BOYARIN, supra note 17, at 253.
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Freud adds the second and final point: Christianity was a fundamental
advance in resolution of the conflict over the killing of the father and
hence in the mental growth needed for a responsible, self-reflexive
civilization to emerge. The key to this advance in Christianity is the
sacrifice of the son: The sacrifice "had to be a Son, for the sin had
been murder of the Father. 13 7 Although he is ambivalent toward
Christianity, ultimately he inscribes it in a teleology analogous to the
therapeutic narrative of progressive self-recognition by the recovering
neurotic. Unfortunately, when the Jews responded to Moses, "an
eminent father substitute,"
' 13 8
[i]t was a case of acting instead of remembering, something which
often happens during analytic work with neurotics. They respond-
ed to the doctrine of Moses-which should have been a stimulus
to their memory-by denying their act, did not progress beyond
the recognition of the great father, and barred the passage to the
point where Paul started his continuation of primeval history.
139
Hence the answer to the riddle of Jewish distinctiveness. The Jews
stand out and are made to suffer because they were "unable to
participate in the progress that this [Christian] confession to the
murder of God betokened."'" Freud thereby suggests that Chris-
tianity, with its ritualized acknowledgment (rather than repression) of
the murder of the primal Father-become-God, is a fundamental
advance toward autonomous, self-reflexive collective adulthood, while
Jewishness is inherently neurotic. Psychoanalysis (at least in a certain
middlebrow understanding) 1 ' promises the individual the insight
into the founding repressions of his self-formation that would allow
him to recognize and take responsibility for his baser aspects and thus
finally to achieve the Protestant ideal of self-governance in which the
"self is both reader and text"'42; it might thus be understood as
offering in turn the evolutionary step beyond that initial Christian
recognition 4 3
137. See MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 69, at 110.
138. See id. at 113.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See id. at 176.
141. According to which the "Western humanistic premise [of psychoanalysis is] the freedom
of the individual through self-knowledge." Stephen Rittenberg & Herbert Wyman, Letter, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at A28.
142. LUXON, supra note 27, at 103.
143. In this respect Daniel Boyarin's characterization of Freud's rewriting of Judaism "as
'manly' Protestantism avant le lettre," Boyarin, supra note 84, at 15, is somewhat misleading.
Inasmuch as Protestantism incorporates the necessary intermediate step of "confession to the
murder of God" and then transcends the subsequent guilt through self-governance, even a highly
ethical Judaism must remain backward in Freud's account. See again the preface to the Hebrew
edition of Totem and Taboo, where Freud expresses the wish to see an "analytic" Judaism. Nor
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Freud's emphasis on instincts and the "animal nature" of man may
obscure his answer to the inevitable conflict between the need for
Law and the struggle of human, egoistical Nature against that Law,
namely, the idea of psychoanalytic insight into the self, which is in
turn a psychologically informed variant of the Kantian ideal of
self-regulation. Freud dreamed of solving the Kantian double bind
through the analytic process of reflectively acknowledging and thus
incorporating, making proper to one's self, the external (instinctive
and biographical) determinants of identity. This attempt to resolve the
paradox between the brute fact of external determination and the
demand for autonomy through recognition, acknowledgment, and
atonement follows the same logic as Freud's account of the Christian
atonement for the murder of the Father by the sacrifice of the Son,
an act Freud regards as an advance in civilizational consciousness. Yet
this entire schema actually presupposes the prior separation between
self and other (here, especially ego and parent). This can be seen in
the persistent theme in Totem and Taboo contrasting the cosmological
projections "outside" the self of primitive man with the Freudian
injunction to realize the source of our own projections and thus to
master them. By the same token, Freud's highly ethnocentric and
progressivist account of the totem system in Totem and Taboo blocks
a recognition of the value of contingent, symbolic, or displaced-
rather than analytic-resolutions of the tensions between living and
dying, choosing and obeying. Only from the perspective of the
separated organism is it obvious that these are "real" dichotomies that
one ultimately must confront in order to be self-responsible.
This section has argued that Freud's understanding of human beings
as "essentially" animals and as such primarily selfish, combined with
his fundamental assent to the notion of the species's progress away
from na'vet6 and projection toward realistic self-knowledge and
responsibility, produced an account of selfhood that-whatever its
insights-militates against recognition of the creative value of other
patterns of identity produced by cultures that are not hampered by
such limitations. Insofar as a critical theory of Western law continues
to share Freud's reductive bias, it remains trapped within the dilemma
of ascribing to law a coercive power that, such theory must ultimately
claim, is nevertheless "in reality" derivative or illusory. The next
section therefore sketches an account of law and identity that
recognizes the contingency of Western ideas concerning both the
animal/human split and the inherent tendency toward progressive
enlightenment.
normative style of assimilating German Jewishness). BOYARIN, supra note 17, at 249.
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Totem and Taboo, Freud's most extended essay in the psychology
of "primitive" societies, suggests in effect that the first law is the
prohibition of incest." One of the ways he explores the theme is
through a briefly stated hypothesis concerning the origins of habitual
mutual avoidance between sons-in-law and their mothers-in-law.
Freud claims that these tense relations are informed by a suppressed
"incestuous" impulse.145 In this account, the modifying words
"in-law" thus operate as a further restraint on a transferred incestuous
impulse between biological mother and child, which is itself restrained
by the original impulse taboo. Here law appears not as something
enabling and structuring relations, but as a cautionary reminder
keeping instincts in check. This section will reinvestigate the terrain
of law and genealogy, stressing the ways that the symbolic structuring
of kinship in law and language not only blocks but enables fecund and
creative possibilities for generational transformation and continuity.
Freud's passage on the dangers of the relationship between
mother-in-law and son-in-law can be fruitfully contrasted to the
traditional Jewish theme of the desire for a worthy son-in-law on the
part of a father of a female. Daniel Boyarin has analyzed several
rabbinic texts that deal with the tension between biological and
textual filiation-between sons and students-in rabbinic culture.
1 6
This tension was ideally and often in fact mediated through the
strategem of choosing one's son-in-law. As in the world of classical
East European yeshivas (notably during the nineteenth century), this
strategem served as a means of preserving or strengthening a
hierarchy, when a favored student would marry the daughter of the
head of the yeshiva and thus eventually accede to his position by a
combination of merit and inherited "right." When the marriage
arrangements involved a period of support by the bride's parents for
the young couple while the groom continued his studies, the
son-in-law would remain literally dependent for a time on his
parents-in-law. The attempt to acquire a scholarly son-in-law could
likewise be a form of social climbing, a means of transforming
acquired wealth into social prestige. 47 This Law-of-the-Father-in-
144. See TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 69, at 4.
145. Id. at 20-22.
146. BOYARIN, CARNAL ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 206-12.
147. Thus the story of the Jewish peasant who tells his wife he's going to town to look for
a son-in-law. "But we don't have a daughter," responds his wife. The husband is undisturbed:
"Never mind-there should be a son-in-law around the house!" EMANNUEL OLSVANGER, ROYTE
POMERANTSEN 15 (1947); see also Benjamin, supra note 3, at 135 (alluding to motif of Jewish
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Law might be understood as an extension and elaboration of the
sequence of transitions of birthright that, one after the other,
consistently deny primogeniture 1 8 in the stories of Isaac and
Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, and Joseph and his brothers. One might
almost say that, unlike the psychoanalytic account in which the Father
institutes law, here the determination of filiation (and hence pater-
nity) is dependent upon a lawful narrative.'49
In all of its variations, the motif reflects a link among textuality,
generation and masculinist elitism in the workings of Jewishness.
Contrary to the structuralist view that would link linguistic binaries
with elementary patterns of exogamous kinship, the denial of
primogeniture and the emphasis on in-law-hood in Jewishness (once
the ethnos has been established) always are about an endogamous
masculine exchange.
The Lacanian rewriting of psychoanalysis follows Lvi-Strauss's
structuralist account of exogamous "exchange[s] of women" between
"lineages. '" 0 In this notion of kinship, the relation of in-laws is
short-circuited, naturalized into a relation between the son and the
father in which the son is guaranteed "a position as heir to the father's
position." '' Indeed, women as objects of exchange are precisely not
subjects or actors in this account. Furthermore, this account that
equates exchange among masculinist lineages to replacement of
fathers by sons also makes all fathers interchangeable with each other.
This story, within which the account of the Oedipal drama linking
mother, father, and son is straightforwardly extended into resolution
through the son's ultimate "inheritance" directly from the father, must
be recognized as having its own cultural particularity.
By contrast, even psychoanalytic discussions of the foundation of
law tend to turn to the Old Testament rather than to Oedipus.
Perhaps in this they are swayed by the Freudian distinction between
the Oedipal myth as an expression of family structure and the Moses
story as founding a community joined by the initial repression
148. See Cover, Narrative, Violence, and the Law, in ESSAYS OF COVER, supra note 20, at
115.
149. In the medieval Christian understanding of the contrast between circumcision and
baptism, the first wounding of Jesus that inaugurates the Passion leading up to his final Passover
or "Easter" is none other than his circumcision. "The succession of ceremonies embodies the
opposition between the carnal Synagogue and the spiritual Church. The antagonism between the
bloody sacrifice of the ancient Law and the Christian sacrament-baptism, then
Eucharist-marks therefore the very body of the one who introduces the rupture."
FABRE-VASSAS, supra note 81, at 211. According to Jewish tradition, this circumcision (this
"bloody sacrifice" in the medieval Christian recoding) would have been performed by Jesus's
father. Mary's husband Joseph (oddly positioned, in any case, as the husband of a virgin) is thus
implicitly constructed as the first illegitimate father.
150. Schroeder, supra note 122, at 899.
151. Id. at 899-900, n.357 (citing Elizabeth Grosz's Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction).
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inscribed by the written Law. To those operating on the unreflective
Pauline assumption that "the letter killeth," the failure to consider a
mythical foundation of law in Greek myth proper may have to do
precisely with the oral character of Greek myth.52 It may be as well
that the tendency to see Oedipus as reflecting family structure and
Exodus as founding polity reflects the prior tendency in the West to
distinguish sharply between public, communal Law and private family
structures.
Of course, family structure is not so easily separated from law.153
Freud's idea of "civilization" rests not on the
Law-of-the-Father-in-Law in which filiation is contingently based on
a synthesis of "biological" and "symbolic" orders, but on the Law of
the Father based on an Oedipal myth ideal of philosophy and
autonomy. The story of the Oedipus complex is an anti-generational
narrative not only because it focuses on the realization of a separated
individual ego, but also because the model of struggle, conquest, and
supplantation as the moral perfection of the individual self tends to
crowd out the values of cultural transmission and transgenerational
identification and perspective on change as contingent, not necessarily
"progressive."1 5" Where power and identity-the roles of parent,
lover, and child-are contained quanta in a zero sum game, only
displacement is possible, and we must kill our parents in order to
become ourselves: "Without the guilty deed of parricide there is no
autonomous self. And further, also from the viewpoint of received
morality, individuality and its maturity-I am not speaking of
unbridled individualism-is a virtue, a summum bonum, at any rate
in modem Western civilizations."' 55 Hence to the first command of
autonomy, "Thou shalt be free," can be added another: "Thou shalt
kill me." No wonder, then, that the Law of the Father is a problem
for the autonomist West. Working through that problem requires,
among other things, acknowledging the limitations of the cultural
framework within which it continues to arise.
152. Thus Oedipus appears only in the title of Goodrich's Oedipus Lex. GOODRICH, supra
note 8. According to this argument, Goodrich's total avoidance of the question of Greek origins
anywhere except in his title would reflect Goodrich's own persistence in confusing the written
letter per se with "the Law" that his book is intended to demystify.
153. Jean-Joseph Goux links Oedipus firmly to the establishment of both codified law and
speculative philosophy. "Oedipus is the prototypical figure of the philosopher, the one who
challenges sacred enigmas in order to establish the perspective of man and self." JEAN-JOSEPH
Goux, OEDIPUS, PHILOSOPHER 3 (1993).
154. See Humphrey Morris, Narrative Representation, Narrative Enactment, and the
Psychoanalytic Construction of History, 74 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 33,40 (1993) (suggesting
that theory always wants to be ideally atemporal, but always "falls" back into narrative despite
itself).
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Staking everything on the claim that we are really descended from
a primal horde of hostile and hierarchical gorillas, Freud cannot see
the truth value of another story in which certain groups of people tell
each other that they are joined in descent from bears.5 6 In part
because the logical categories of Roman jurisprudence separate
humans as "subjects" from animals (along with plants and inanimate
things) as "objects," Western thinking tends to maintain our separate
status.157 Thus Darwin's story about the descent of humans from
other primates troubled philosophical anthropology not merely
because it challenged the Biblical creation story, but because it
interrupted this fundamental Western scheme of separate clas-
sification. The story of human evolution is then another motive for
Freud's attempt to explain how symbolism, law, and language came
to be superimposed on an animal nature to constitute "civilized"
humanity."8 However, we can state a claim for the necessity of law
that is not based on the presumption that without law we would fall
into barbarism, but rather that without law we would not be. Symbolic
ordering-law and language-is not what separates or raises us from
the animals, but what defines the kind of animal we are."5 9 Recog-
nizing that neither of these totemisms (descent from gorillas or
descent from bears) is just a story will be part of my answer to the
dilemma of the impossible illegitimacy of law.
156. The troubled distinction between animals and humans is not a universal of culture, but
particularly prominent in Western Christianity. See, e.g., Patricia Seed, 'Are These Not Also
Men?': The Indians' Humanity and Capacity for Spanish Civilisation, 25 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 629
(1993). On bears in legal theory, see generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) and particularly id. at 6 ("'But what's the
book about?' my sister asks .... 'Howard Beach, polar bears, and food stamps,' I snap back.").
The attack on totemism (also referred to as ancestor worship) reappears in the context of
contemporary constitutional theory: "[W]e too may find the stability of authority and the
gratifying support of tradition in acts of ancestor worship. Nothing, however, would have
mortified the actual founders of the republic more deeply. Every page of The Federalist Papers
is a call to the people of America to take its fate into its own hands .... The good citizen of
today can do no less." JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 10 (1991). Shklar's rhetoric wonderfully exemplifies the paradox of generational
autonomy: We must not be overly pious toward the ancestors, lest we mortify them!
157. See PIERRE LEGENDRE, L'INESTIMABLE OBJET DE LA TRANSMISSION: tTUDE SUR LE
PRINCIPE GPNIALOGIQUE EN OCCIDENT 24-26 (1985).
158. The combination of moral and physical associations in the term "upright" illustrate this
nexus. "Freud's insistent repetition of aufrecht and its cognate Aufrechtung goes beyond marking
an evolutionary juncture and appears to superimpose a moralistic perspective. The term's con-
notations suggest that with the raising of the bent-over human posture came the ascendancy of
the manly, bourgeois values of honest, sincerity, uprightness." Jay Geller, The Aromatics of
Jewish Difference; or, Benjamin's Allegory of Aura, in JEWS AND OTHER DIFFERENCES: THE
NEW JEWISH CULTURAL STUDIES 203, 225 (Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyarin eds., 1997).
This moral-physical development entails the repression of the olfactory sense, associated with
animals, primitives... and culturally backward Jews. Id.
159. To a great extent, what follows is intended as an elaboration in a different register of
Judith Butler's point that to say human social identities are "constructed" is not to make them
any less "real." JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, at xxx (1993).
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In an Enlightenment perspective, the necessity of symbolism to
human existence mandates that we acknowledge a necessary measure
of "arbitrariness":
[W]hatever culture may be it includes "the imposition of
arbitrary form upon the environment." This phrase has two
components. One is a recognition that the relationship between
the coding process and the phenomenon (be it a tool, social
network, or abstract principle) is non-iconic. The other is an idea
of man as a creature who can make delusional systems
work-who imposes his fantasies, his non-iconic constructs (and
constructions), upon the environment. The altered evironment
shapes his perceptions, and these are again forced back upon the
environment, are incorporated into the environment, and press
for further adaptation."
This statement by an American physical anthropologist retains the
distinction between "fantasy" and "environment," yet it constitutes an
attempt to describe enculturation as human adaptation (how we do it),
rather than human advancement (what we've achieved). It therefore
has the advantage of removing the progressivist assumptions of
language as "higher" than reality. A similar shift from the Freudian
repression myth on the one hand to the reformulation of
psychoanalysis as founded in the very problem of separation through
language on the other hand is crucial here. The view of culture,
language or law as imposition underlies Freud's repressive account of
the paternal Law: "For men knew that they had disposed of their
father by violence, and in their reaction to that impious deed, they
determined to respect his will thenceforward." ''
The presence of language-non-iconic, symbolic systems of com-
munication-is a specific evolutionary adaptation related to the
160. Ralph Holloway, Culture: A Human Domain, 10 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 395, 399
(1969).
161. FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, supra note 69, at 54. In Moses and Monotheism, the
institution of law as a collective self-punishment is even more concisely and sharply portrayed:
"After their hatred had been satisfied by their act of aggression [killing the father], their love
came to the fore in their remorse for the deed. It set up the super-ego by identification with the
father; it gave that agency the father's power, as though a punishment for the deed of aggression
they had carried out against him, and it created the restrictions which were intended to prevent
a repetition of the deed." MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 69, at 95.
The idea of something like a founding law of the mother has recently been proposed, based
on "female child-rearing and economic priorities, female ultimate determination of social struc-
ture and female sexual self-restraint in women's own direct material interests." KNIGHT, supra
note 100, at 153. All of these are directly connected, in Knight's account, with collective female
manipulation of male's hunting activity and regulated redistribution of the spoils of hunt through
the prohibition against eating one's own kill, linked back to matriliny and the incest taboo. What
seems most unfortunate about this otherwise intriguing feminist origin story is that it is utterly
silent about the central importance of gathering-itself largely a female activity-in providing
the sustenance of females, males and juveniles infants in hunter-gatherer societies.
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extraordinarily long period of dependence in human infants;
"prolonged growth and dependency go along with larger brains and
longer periods of learning.' ' 162 Significantly, while Jacques Lacan
notes the crucial importance of this relation, the way he discusses it
suggests something not quite "natural." For Lacan, the crux of the
matter is "real specific prematurity of birth in man." 63 The posited
"prematurity" suggests that it would be more normal to be born
independent, that is to be autonomous by nature, but that this is not
the human situation. For humans, the first stage of formation of the
subject, the "mirror stage," "is precipitated from insufficiency to
anticipation,"" never in sync with itself, thus producing the absence
or lack that in Lacan's view is always part of human being. The
central human experience of "mdconnaissance," not of false knowing
but of a kind of knowing that is always pre-shaped in specified ways,
is here still characterized as a "junction of nature and culture,"165
not more fully integrated as it will be by Legendre. Despite the
insufficiency of its biological assumptions or the actual cultural and
historical limitations of its supposed universal theorizing, Lacan's
theory of the subject nevertheless moves toward a view of language
as material, as constitutive of the human not because humans are a
combination of "animal and spiritual nature," but because culture is
the human dimension of adaptation.
In the text on "The Mirror Stage," dating from 1949, Lacan
mentions that it had been introduced "at our last congress, thirteen
years ago."'166 In other words, World War II had intervened. The
conclusion of that short text is of the utmost topicality: a critique of
the Cartesian cogito, t67 up to the existentialist philosophy that is its
heir. Existentialism, argues Lacan, arises as an explanation of the
impasse of "the historical effort of a society to refuse to recognize
that it has any function other than the utilitarian one, and in the
anxiety of the individual confronting the 'concentrational' form of the
social bond that seems to arise to crown this effort."'" So far the
critique is remarkably complementary to that of Horkheimer and
162. Ralph Holloway, Culture, Symbols and Human Brain Evolution: A Synthesis, 5
DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 287, 300 (1982).
163. Jacques Lacan, The Mirror Stage, in LACAN, supra note 118, at 1, 4. This early essay
may not be entirely representative in terms of the overall structure of Lacan's thought. Yet the
suggestion of something "unnatural" about human growth patterns suggests once again an
objectivist metaphysics that belies his claim to "oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the
Cogito." Id. at 1; see also Humphrey Morris, Reflections on Lacan: His Origins In Descartes and
Freud, 57 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 186 (1988).
164. Lacan, supra note 163.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id. at 1.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 6.
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Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.169 Yet rather than focusing on
a historical "disenchantment of the world," Lacan concentrates here
more narrowly and sharply on the necessary failure of any
post-humanist theory that assumes the priority of a normal rationality
through "the perception-consciousness system."' 7 Individualism is
linked to empiricism and a concentration-camp society that, Lacan
suggests, may be the ultimate expression of utilitarian
functionalism.171 As the translator's note to this passage in Lacan
explains, the term translated as "concentrational"-"concentrati-
onnaire"-derives from the experience of prisoners in Nazi con-
centration camps.172 The centrality of the anti-Semitic program to
the Nazi myth in general1 73 suggests in turn the urgency of con-
sidering how the figure of Jewish difference perturbs any monumental
characterization of universal or even general "Western" progress.174
However, further insight into this suggestion of links among Jewish-
ness, anti-Semitism and individualist empiricism requires critique of
Lacan.
Lacan's revisionist psychoanalysis points to the fundamental
importance of language, yet his rereading of Oedipal development
retains the notion of patriarchal "linguistic structures" that operate in
such fashion that "It]he entire concept of identity takes place through
[the] repression of the mother.' 1 75 Lacan's naturalization of the
mother-child dyad is essential to the link between fatherhood and
language as that which removes the child and initiates "him" unnatu-
rally into the cultural, symbolic Law of the Father, and thus into
desire for the forbidden feminine. Indeed, in an extraordinary reading
of several of the Ten Commandments, Lacan interprets the interdic-
tion against coveting as that which inaugurates awareness of the
now-desired maternal object. Lacan suggests the priority of Ego
before the Law, the way the interdiction against coveting inaugurates
169. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
(1972).
170. Lacan, supra note 163, at 6.
171. See BRENKMAN, supra note 105, at 152 ("Lacan sensed a deep-seated crisis in the
shaping of individuality in modem society ... [Lacan's statements on this subject] blend a
radical critique of the Enlightenment with a barely disguised masculine protest.").
172. And, it may be, more directly from the original French title of Albert Rousset's
memoir, ALBERT ROUSSET, L'UNIVERS CONCENTRATIONNAIRE (1947) (translated as THE
OTHER KINGDOM (Ramon Guthrie trans., 1982)).
173. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, The Nazi Myth, 16 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 291 (1990).
174. Thus Goux, for example, in universalizing the transition from "monomyth" to
"Oedipus," invokes Eliade's dichotomy between cyclical and linear societies, describing "every
society that breaks away from repetion and experiences something of the order of 'progres-
sion'. . . [as] Oedipean .... Goux, supra note 153, at 204.
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a heightened awareness of the now-desired maternal object, and Ego's
resulting desire for death. 76 Lacan himself acknowledges that this
paradoxical assertion that the interdiction produces the desire for its
transgression, the urge as it were to reach across the barrier for the
object that can be perceived only once there is a barrier, is a
paraphrase of Paul's assertion in Romans that "I would not have
known sin, if it were not for the law." '177 "Before the Law," that is,
there is innocent unity.178 Without Law-specifically, without the
Decalogue and its transgression-society is impossible.179
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has recently argued that Lacan's attempt to
resolve the Oedipus problem leads back to a realist biologism that is
impossible according to Lacan's own schematic distinction among
Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic realms,180 in which the Real is that
to which we have no direct access.'8 ' Borch-Jacobsen's analysis
suggests that Lacan's structural model is actually extraordinarily static
and hence cannot possibly give a satisfactory account of the relations
between identification and separation. In Lacan's case, as
Borch-Jacobsen argues, the only guarantee that a son's identification
will lead to a symbolic replacement of the father rather than an
imaginary desire for the father is "[n]othing. Nothing except the
symbolic Law, which demands that that is the way it is. In fact, Lacan
always falls back on it as a last resort-on the Law and the No [Non]
of the symbolic father, which forbids imaginary identification with the
phallus."'" Borch-Jacobsen stresses that Lacan's dilemma is entailed
by the assumption that the mother is only an object of desire, the
father only a subject to be imitated 83 -or, in the terms I have been
using, the mother only nature and the father only language.
176. LACAN, supra note 90, at 101.
177. Romans 7:7.
178. See also Lacan's postulation of a "co-conformity... of Law and desire, stemming from
the fact that both are bom together .... " LACAN, supra note 90, at 89.
179. Id. at 84.
180. In this sense, Lacan's insistence on the distinctions among these three realms leads into
problems of authority analogous to the Protestant rejection of ritual and allegory. By contrast,
Claudine Fabre-Vassas details a ritualized "developmental schema" observed in traditional
European Catholic society, through which infants become boys and then men simultaneously
with their transformation from little "Jews" into properly socialized Christians. See
FABRE-VASSAS, supra note 81, at 251-58. It might be worthwhile exploring the notion that the
modem philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse of identity formation is in large part the
search for a schema to replace that traditional ritual format, which has been banished in
Protestant modernity.
181. See Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Oedipus Problem in Freud and Lacan, 20 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 267 (1994).
182. Id. at 281. It should also be noted that there is simultaneous confusion and reinfor-
cement between two derivations of the Law of the Father. In one, which I have not emphasized
here, the Law of the Father is an arbitrary imposition because paternity is ultimately
indeterminate, while in the latter, the Law of the Father is an arbitrary imposition because of
the presumed natural and harmonious unity of the mother/son dyad.
183. Id. at 269.
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On the other hand, a system where filiation is conceived without an
a priori, metaphysical dualism (between the symbolic or com-
municative on one hand, and the biological or "sexual" on the other)
need not be structurally plagued by the evident contradiction between
the two commands of the Oedipal father to "be like me (a virile man)
and do not be like me (that is, do not enter into homosexual rivalry
with me)."' '8 Such a system is suggested by the synthesizing and
non-Pauline approach of Pierre Legendre, which emphasizes that
enmeshment within some symbolic order or sets of symbolic orders is
intrinsic to human existence, rather than an alien imposition onto a
prior humanity.1 85 Legendre offers a reformulated Law of the Father
minus the catastrophic implications of the patricidal myth. For
Legendre, "the law of the Father is nothing other than an original
separation which inaugurates subjective life (in the sense of a separa-
tion of the infant from the maternal entity), as subject to the law of
differentiation through speech., 186 Despite the retention of the
gendered language, Legendre insists:
In no way should this problematic be confounded with the
history of those conceptions called patriarchal, in contrast to
matriarchal ones, relating to progenitive systems, still less with
the history of the struggle of the sexes. It is rather a problematic
of the power to refer that is the condition of the subject's entry
into language.""
The reformulation is crucial. Reference, differentiation, and subjec-
tivity are still connected through language, but language is no longer
linked in a determinate way to repression, masculinity, developmental
supersession, and a second if "higher" order. Separation and repres-
sion are uncoupled. Indeed, in this formulation mothers can be readily
understood as important agents of separation from their children.188
Identity need not (and thus may not always) work through repression
of the mother. At the same time, subjectivity is not necessarily
bounded by the spacetime limits of the organism; since language is
184. Id. at 281.
185. LEGENDRE, supra note 2.
186. Id. at 950. Lacan's linkage of language and fatherhood is fundamentally tied to the
anthropological thesis that paternity, unlike maternity, is always "factually" uncertain and hence
must always be symbolically ratified in order to be socially real. To Legendre it is clear that
"subjective life" in no way implies a sovereign subjectivity; hence being "subject" to a law does
not immediately raise the paradox of illegitimate constraint.
187. Id. at 950-51.
188. See the discussion of women's role in circumcision rituals in Gil Anidjar, On the
(Under)cutting Edge. Does Jewish Memory Need Sharpening?, in JEWS AND OTHER
DIFFERENCES, supra note 158, at 360. Anidjar notes that "a representation of the original
mother-son first couple [leaves] intact the assumption that there is a nature upon which culture
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intrinsic to the humanly real, both connection and separation can be
encompassed with its function of "differentiation."
At this point it is at last possible to understand the connection
between Legendre's insistence on the importance of Jewish textual
practice to understanding the dynamics of Western identity189 and
his reformulation of the role of language in subjectivity. Jewishness
(although of course not only Jewishness) illustrates the stakes of this
reformulation. If, as has recently been suggested, a substantially
different construction of masculinity and paternity is at work in
rabbinic culture,1" then a blanket attempt to dismantle what is
presumed to be a universally repressive "Law of the Father" will
operate to obviate a living possibility of Jewishness along with other
different laws with different potentials for creative subversion. The
Jewish account of the origins of humanity and then of "Jews"
concerns neither patricide nor the anxiety of a male individual (child
or adult) alone in the universe. Both of these Biblical "origin"
accounts are about the terms on which generation is going to be
guaranteed. Consequent with the transgression that institutes
knowledge and suffering, explicit mention is made of Eve's punish-
ment of painful birthing. The essence of the divine promise to the first
Jewish father, Abraham, is precisely that of fruitful generation.
Crucially important to the ethos of Jewishness, this early moment
stresses the connection between symbolic orders and reproduction
that constitutes genealogy.
Legendre emphasizes precisely that connection as essential to every
human group,'91  as defining the species without regard to
superstition or Enlightenment. We must, he states:
place the genealogical principle where it should be. One charac-
teristic makes the human something distinctive among the living:
[that characteristic is] speech. Genealogy is a concept which can
serve to class and comprehend the facts of reproduction concer-
ning man as well among the species. But, speaking of reproduc-
189. LEGENDRE, supra note 2.
190. BOYARIN, supra note 21.
191. For further evidence of the occlusion of the relationship of genealogical rules in
general-and specifically of fathers-in-law and sons-in-law-in Western discourse, see the curious
account by Peter Goodrich of the frustration attendant upon his initial attempts to bring
Legendre's name and ideas into some circulation among English-reading legal scholars. The
editors of a journal to which he had submitted an essay on Legendre found that "the name
Legendre was suspicious-it sounded invented, legendary even .... and ultimately rejected the
article on the grounds that Legendre "in all probability did not exist." Peter Goodrich,
Translating Legendre or, the Poetical Sermon of a Contemporary Jurist, 16 CARDozo L. REV.
963, 965 (1995). Perhaps the editors found something Fishy or even Fissy about the idea of a
theorist named The Son-in-Law, although since Goodrich is claiming that it was the very idea
of a connection between psychoanalysis and law that was being repressed, the same problems
might have been attendant upon a putative French theorist named Lefils.
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tion remains the deed of man; instituting (instituer) the living is
a fact of discourse, and this presupposes humanity.'
Of the two stories of the creation of the first man and woman in
Genesis, only one takes account, as it were, of Legendre's thesis. In
Genesis 1:27-31, "Man" is created "male and female." There is no
mention of language, or death, or gender hierarchy. Genesis 2:7-24 is
quite different. It recounts the creation of only one "Adam." Rules
are given to this Adam, infraction of which will be punishable by
death. Adam is given the power of naming, "and whatsoever the man
would call every living creature, that was to be the name thereof." '193
We, subsequently, do not enjoy the same unconstrained power of
naming and hence of construction as did Adam. The issue then
centers on degrees of constraint in constructing a received corpus, or
in Legendre's terms, relative distance from the text. Legendre asserts
that "juridical relations (le juridisme) are organized according to a
maneuver which operates to regulate greater or lesser distance
between the subject and what is written."194 He goes on to identify
the fundamental difference in modes of relation and distancing
between subject and text in Christianity and Judaism (what we might
call different "somatotextualities") as the entry point for his discussion
of the general power of "it is written" in Western culture, but
nowhere does he attempt to specify what the Jewish mode might
be. 95 He might have added that "editing"-selective emphasis in
transmission of what is written-is also a key technology in the
organization of juridical relations. When this particular old story-not
the story that institutes law or patriarchy, but the one that has most
powerfully come down to us-is told in the West, the tale of man and
woman inaugurating language, gender hierarchy, and genealogy is the
one that is more commonly remembered. Curiously, however, the
very fact that the Bible refuses to acknowledge itself as a fable means
that the other story of simultaneous creation of both sexes need not
and cannot be discarded. 96 As recent commentators have suggested,
this multiplicity within the text enables a strategy acknowledging
192. LEGENDRE, supra note 157, at 9.
193. Genesis 2:19. See the suggestive discussion of language in creation in Waiter Benjamin,
On Language As Such and on the Language of Man, in REFLECTIONS 314 (Peter Demetz ed.
& Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978). For a concise feminist critique of Adamic naming as
masculinist repression, see URSULA K. LEGUIN, She Unnames Them, in BUFFALO GALS 233
(1987).
194. LEGENDRE, supra note 2, at 292. Presumably Legendre's use of "writing" here is not
intended to exclude oral societies, given his argument about the centrality of speech.
195. Id. at 289-97.
196. For explorations of the nuancing, ameliorative, or critical interpretive possibilities
afforded the tradition by the difference between these two stories, see BOYARIN, CARNAL
ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 77. For a contemporary defense of Eve against the charge of "sin," see
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genealogical attachment and self-formation in relation to the text,
without surrender to the dominant monological and masculinist
readings by which the text has been interpreted and transmitted.
197
Both the very fact that two contradictory and authoritative accounts
of human creation are present in this text, and the thematic differen-
ces between them (one containing language, gender and genealogy,
the other "egalitarian"), confirm the point that symbolic orders are
both necessary and arbitrary. Both foundational fictions-that of an
originary gender equality, with no further attribution making humans
distinctive; and that which institutes at the beginning the arbitrary
power of naming, inaugurating separation and hierarchy, demand
response.
My suggestion is that the ways in which texts become intelligible
and the ways in which subjects are formed are analogous in Jewish-
ness: Just as a hermeneutic tradition is inseparable from any possible
interpretation within Jewishness, genealogy is inseparable from the
formation of any subject recognizable as Jewish. These analogous
interdependencies provide a partial mediation of the notion that the
relation between self and other, or between signifier and signified, is
inevitably agonistic. The mediation is partial because, in these terms
that Jewish discourse does share with "the rest of the West," there is
indeed a structuring of identity and alterity.
The founding of the people Israel is analogous to the creation story
in its double character. What Israel was before the contract/covenant
with God was not autonomous males, but a slave or sojourner
people.198 The mentality of "enslavement" to God, through the text
and practice of Torah, and the commandment to remember slavery
are inseparable one from the other in the formation of the Torah
complex.1 99 Yet the relation between this new people Israel and
God is twofold. One presentation of the covenant is as a statement of
obligation without bargain, in which "the Israelites are morally
197. See, e.g., MIEKE BAL, LETHAL LOVE (1987).
198. See MICHAEL WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION (1985), along with the sharply
worded response by Edward Said, Michael Walzer's Exodus and Revolution: A Canaanite
Reading, 5 GRAND STREET 86 (1985). Both of these works are limited by an overbearing
presentism. See Jonathan Boyarin, Reading Exodus Into History, 23 NEw LITERARY HIST. 523
(1992). A list of all of the places in the Torah where Israel is reminded that it was "slaves" or
"sojourners" in Egypt is provided in Harry P. Nasuti, Identity, Identification and Imitation: The
Narrative Hermeneutics of Biblical Law, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 9, 12-13 (1986).
199. Thus the consensus rabbinic interpretation of Deuteronomy 16:3: "That thou mayest
remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all the days of thy life." The
rabbis explain, "Had it been written 'the days of thy life,' it would have meant this world only;
'all the days of thy life' means that the times of the Messiah are included as well."' The passage
is found in the Passover Haggadah; it was originally a midrash. Mishnah Berakhot 1.5; Sifre
Deuteronomy 130; Mekhilta 13:3. The point here is that in this view, even in the times of the
Messiah there is not a "we" separate from biology and more broadly from a genealogy that is
at once embodied and symbolic. Genealogy is anamnestic, it does not forget.
390
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indebted to God for redeeming them from slavery."2" The other
presentation describes a conditional contract, an offer by God and its
acceptance by Israel. In this version, God's redemption of Israel from
Egypt serves not to obligate them a priori, but to reassure them that
if you "keep my covenant, then ye shall be Mine own treasure from
among all peoples ....
Sustaining this notion of Torah necessitates remembering its entire
history. It cannot withstand the assumption that what is "true" or
unalienated Torah is the Law that operates in an autonomous, unified
and unitary Jewish regime (Land, State, Kingdom) of Israel, precisely
because in that view the "living" Torah exercised in "real life"
conditions is dependent on collective Jewish autonomy. There the
violence of a state law' would devolve upon Torah as well." 3
The Jewish situation of semi-autonomy in diaspora 21 sustains the
double sense of the covenant. The sense of exile enforces the memory
of slavery and sojourn; the assurance of ultimate special divine regard
compensates for current subalternity. It may be that a great deal of
the ambivalence about the Jewish relation to God in Christianity
generally has to do with the way Jewishness persistently disturbs
principles of individual freedom, while maddeningly insisting on a
constrained plurality of meanings tied to the genealogically in-
separable production of both interpretations and descendants, against
the ideal of a univocal truth proper to an individual person, whether
that person be the infallible Pope or the authorized Protestant
reader.205
200. Louis E. Newman, Covenant and Contract: A Framework for the Analysis of Jewish
Ethics, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 89, 95 (1991) (citing Deuteronomy 4:35-40).
201. Exodus 19:5.
202. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, in ESSAYS OF COVER, supra note 20, at 203.
203. For a concise example of this common view of the relations between "Halakha in
Exile" and in "an essentially Jewish reality," see ELIEZER BERKOVITS, NOT IN HEAVEN: THE
NATURE AND FUNCrION OF HALAKHA (1983).
204. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 13 n.57 (1996) (arguing that "[t]he reality is semi-autonomy; lawmaking groups exist
within lawmaking governments," summarizing Sally F. Moore, Law and Social Change: The
Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 719, 744
(1973)).
205. In its Catholic and Protestant forms, this ideal of univocity derives from the imperial
model of authority:
Here we come upon the stumbling block between two worlds of exegesis, the Jewish and
the Christian. The Christian war [of texts] produced its own rules of arbitration: the
establishment of the 'breathing Law (Lex animata), a direct calque of the imperial model;
a man detached from ordinary descent finds himself promoted to the position of the
supreme Interpreter, the incarnation of absolute Reference. A hierarchisation of
interpretations follows, and thus a particular notion of relation to text, a notion incom-
patible with the Talmudic idea of 'disputes for the sake of Heaven' in the work of exegesis,
much more simply acknowledged as an apprenticeship in filiation, understood as the vital
connection to the place of Truth.
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In terms of modern political and legal theory, the double covenant
establishing Jewishness as a juridical relation of text and subject
disrupts the incompatibility in classic contractarianism between
offer-and-acceptance formation of contract on one hand, and the
master-servant hierarchical relation on the other.2' The tendency to
conceive human relations as necessarily either free and autonomously
entered into or as constrained and in some sense illegitimate matches
the recurrent dichotomy between the repressive and generative
aspects of law. For a critical discourse aimed at liberation, these
dichotomies lead in turn to an almost inevitable impulse to see the
Law as more fundamentally repression than generation.2 7 "Like
Lacan's child with its mirror-image, the individual subject is supplied
with an idealized image, a misrecognition, of autonomy and
freedom."2 8 What if there were a law-Jewishness, as I have
described it-that did not have recourse to an assumption of either
original or ideal autonomy?
This radical autonomism, as expressed particularly in the writings
of Nietzsche, has been linked to the terror of personal finitude. °9
The emphasis on "will" in Nietzsche articulates in turn with his
allusion to the "tyranny" of "the sick females, who have unrivaled
resources for dominating, oppressing, tyrannizing.' ' 1  The as-
sociation of the Semitic with the feminine was a commonplace of
nineteenth-century European progressive ideology.211 My point has
been not primarily to explore that fateful association as part of the
pathology of Fascism, but to indicate some of the terrified symptoms
of that prior detachment in which Man is a priori taken as solitary,
autonomous. Where Nietzsche looks to unmask the bastard genealogy
of morals and hence release the creative artistic powers of the
authentic Man of Will toward a glorious future, I point toward the
detachment from generation that initiates that self-annihilating terror,
and its corresponding difficulty of relating to the Law other than by
the dichotomous strategies of abasement or rebellion. Jewishness, by
contrast, if my construction of it is at all plausible, recognizes the
206. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing Locke and the origins of this
incompatibility).
207. See, e.g., David Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36
STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984) (arguing that law is "a form of denial, a way to deal with perceived
contradictions that are too painful for us to hold in consciousness").
208. David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radically Socio-Legal
Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L.J. 651, 674 (1991).
209. Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667, 699 (1990) (referring to
nexus of autonomism and terror as "death wish").
210. NIETZSCHE, supra note 98, at 260.
211. See, e.g., MAURICE OLENDER, THE LANGUAGES OF PARADISE: RACE, RELIGION, AND
PHILOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992).
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materiality of symbol, language, and law as inseparable from human
existence, and hence regards neither generation (the feminine) nor
law as an imposition on ideal autonomy. Certainly Jewishness does
not contain in itself the answer to the paradoxical demands of
species-wide and culturally-particularist identifications, nor to the
species-historical problem of sexism, let alone to the contingent
persistence of a host of other dominations. My central effort to
demystify the "Old Testament" as the source of Law and patriarchy
would be undermined by simply counterposing Jewishness as the
"solution" to such human problems. Yet documenting the
displacement onto Jewishness of dilemmas endemic to post-Christian
European liberalism, and insisting on the continuing potential of
Jewishness as one cultural resource for thinking through those
dilemmas nevertheless seems worthwhile. Toward that end, I have
worked here to clear away some ultimately spurious commonplaces
and perhaps provide some new clues toward a starting point.
CONCLUSION
In attempting such an ambitious sketch, I have done no more than
support my claim that the tensions between genealogy and autonomy
in the construction of juridical identity in the modern West are closely
linked to arguments about Christian and Jewish hermeneutics and
rhetorics of identity."2 For this claim does not only cast into a
contingent and historicized light the ideal of autonomy underlying the
claims to universal validity of Western law. It also undermines any
lingering notion that the Western account of law and identity is itself
the very model of autonomy, free from dependence on the "arbitrary"
authority of particular effects of history and culture. Rather, it is
entirely conceivable for the Occident and its law to reach an impasse
that cannot be reduced to a moment in its dialectical teleology.
Framed with the use of particular resources and in response to
particular exigencies-those I stress here being the mediation of
tensions between Christian supersession and Jewish textual authority,
and between idealized autonomy and effective genealogy-Western
law may not be adequate to millenial challenges including
globalization, the delegitimation of gender hierarchies and the
degradation of the planet. It is, of course, what we have to work with;
but at the very least, we desperately need to recognize both its blind
spots and the available resources that it continues to repress, more
212. In particular, I do not yet know how my claims about generation helps us better to
understand the general institution of patriarchy, beyond questioning again the usefulness of as-
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often than not quite successfully. This Article is an invitation to the
reader to view Jewishness both as one of the elements to which
Western law responds, and as a resource for our own reinventions of
identity and authority. If it has accomplished that, it has been
successful.
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